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PREFACE
The constitutional democracy of the Western World la today ranged a-
gainst the political forces of the Soviet Union. The tensions created by the
resulting ideological dashes seem to be manifestly increasing rather than
abating. Within this world 3cene each man finds it hi3 part to make political
and social Judgments whether he is consider! ng the actions of a nation or the
personal conduct of one individual. As never before he is confronted with the
need for maintaining a scholarly perspective as a requisite for making sound
Judgments. A wide range of information conditioned by depth of understanding
is a necessary element with which to combat any evils of the political pres-
sure of the moment. A study of contemporary events may result in the amass-
ing of much essential information but a deep understanding of these events can
usually only be gained by a study of historical antecedents. Irrational fears
and warped judgments brought on by the blatant grinding of propaganda machines
and incipient military might become less ominous and more manageable when ref-
erence is made to historical context. Of the political and ideological forces
of the twentieth century, Russian Communism is unquestionably one of the moot
terrifying. For these reasons it is a major purpose of this thesis to pro-
vide at least a small portion of the historical background of Russian Commu-
nism.
Russian Social-Democracy and its current political form, Russian Commu-
nism, have their historic roots in the socialist theories of Karl Marx and
Frederich Engel3. The importance of suoh writings as The Capital and The
Communist Manifesto on later communistic theory is well known. Not so manifest,
however, are the activities of a small group of Russian emigrees and their or-
ganizations of the last decade of the nineteenth century and the early years
It
of the twentieth century. It is with this group of ardent Russian socialists
that this thesis is concerned.
The problem of the thesis was of a two-fold nature. First, it was neaes-
sary to present an account of the embryonic Russian Social-Democratio Party in
its critical years of 1900 to 1905. Secondly, it was necessary to evaluate the
activities of the party during these years in order to determine their signif-
icance, first, in relation to each other and then, in respect to the entire
movement. The thesis wa3 developed, not around a single individual or epochal
event, but rather around the joint enterprise of a Russian socialist sroup, a
conspiratorial underground newspaper. The chief reason for adopting this ap-
proach was to counteract the effeot of biased sources which advanced the im-
portance of some individuals to the complete neglect of others.
Special difficulties in historiography were encountered from the first.
The process of researoh had to depend as it always does on available materials
which were for this problem limited and in many oases of questionable accuracy.
Only a few libraries in the United States have material available for extensive
researoh in Russian history, and even at these libraries such materials are
limited. This situation is of course due in large part to the lack of free
exchange of information between the Soviet Union and the United States at the
present time. Only inside the Soviet Union is the supply of source material
unlimited. Also much writing which would have been of great value to this thesis
has been either suppressed or glossed over by Soviet censorship. Many of the
items which were expurgated from various writings will probably never be recover-
ed. Particularly was strict censorship directed at the material relevant to the
period dealt with in this thesis. The reason being that at that time the pre-
sent leaders of Soviet Russia had not yet gained complete ascendency and their
adversaries were more voaiferous and outspoken. Much was written to refute the
tendencies which have survived but unfortunately little of it has been allow-
ed to remain unvarnished or untouched by the censors* purging. Because, then,
of the prejudiced and incomplete nature of much of the source material a cau-
tious attitude was adopted in the writing of this thesis in an attempt to keep
well within the margin of historical accuracy.
In 3pite of these speoial handicaps, which are to be encountered by any
.unerican research worker in the field of Russian history, it is hoped that the
information set down in this thesis will be a useful patch in the large and
complex quilt of knowledge.
The author wishes to express special thanks and gratitude to Dr. George
Dent tfilcoxon, who, in supervising the<!9 efforts ^ave unselfishly of his time
and valuable advice. Also thanka are certainly due to Miss Elisabeth H. Davis,
Reference Librarian of Kansas State College, who greatly aided the author in
collecting srnrce material from libraries in many parts of the United States
and to the author's wife, Janet Louise, who provided concrete assistance in the
typing of the manuscript and mental inspiration which though more difficult to
evaluate was of supreme importance.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY
Russia and the Narodnikl
The process of revolutionary change which was wrought in Catholic Ger-
many in the sixteenth century, in Anglican England in the seventeenth, and
in Royalist France during the eighteenth may perhaps be said to have found
further abode in Russia during the nineteenth and the first two decades of
the present century. During the fifty years preceding World War I Russia
was the scene of a death struggle between the liberals and ra-iioals, on the
one hand, and the conservatives and reactionaries, on the other. From the
feeble and ill-starred activities of the Deoembrists to the successful bol-
shevik revolution, the Romanov Czardom and the Tussian social order founded
on inequality and special orivilege were under almost constant attack. Of the
many events which stand out in this period of Russian history by far the most
important in respect to future consequences is the gradual development of the
Social-Democratic Party in Russia.
In western Europe most of* the Social-Democratic organizations had been
founded by Karl Marx and his personal followers. The philosophy of The. Capital
and The. Communist Manifesto had provided the cohesive element in these groups
from their very beginning. However, with a contempt whioh grew with familiar-
ity, many such groups began to deviate Prom Marxist views following Marx'e
death in 1883 and some even prior to that time. In Russia the situation was
entirely reversed. Most of the earlier revolutionary groups were non-Marxist.
It was several years after the death of Marx that some Russian revolutionary
groups began to reorganize on the principles of Sooial-Democraey. These groups
gradually became as narrowly Marxian as their western European counterparts
had become deviationists.
The first important Russian groups from which Marxian organizations
later branohed were the Harodniki . or Populist, organizations founded in the
1860's and the 1870's. These groups were nearly always secret because of po-
litical restrictions which \/ere energetically enforced by the Czar's police
force, particularly since the unsuccessful atterpt to assassinate Alexander II
in 1866. They devoted most of their energy to the spreading of propaganda
among the students, the workers, and the peasants. Occasionally Narodnikl
groups would help in organizing strikes and demonstrations auch as the one in
Kazan Square at St. Petersburg in December, 1876, which was foroibly broken up
by the police. The chief aim of the Narodnlki was that of bringing about a
peasant uprising.! It was their view that the Russian peasant could and should
immediately adopt socialism in the rural districts. Of the many persons who
participated in the work of the Harodnikj. . three were of first importance to
later developments of the Russian Social-Democratic Farty. These three were,
George V. Plekhanov, Vera I. Zasulitoh, and Paul Axelrod.
As a student in St. Petersburg, George Plekhanov became acquainted with
the revolutionists of the Karodovol3tv (Will of the People) Party which had been
founded on Harodniki principles. He took part in the St. Petersburg demonstration
of 1876 and soon became a prominent member of the Harodovolstv by writing and
lecturing on party topics. Despite his support of most of the revolutionary
doctrines of the Harodniki he 30on 3evtsred his connections with the Harodovolstv
1 V. I. L«nin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1929),
v. TV, book 2, p. 274.
because of his opposition to the principle of terrorism. As a means to
their goals the Narodnlki had frequently resorted to terroristic acts against
the government. In June, 1879, at the Llpitsk and Voronezh Congresses of
Socialist Narodnlkj, a declaration was made which established terror as one
of the principal political weapons to be used against the Czar. Plekhanov
apparently opposed the use of terror largely because of its ineffectiveness
in the past rather than because of any squeamishness on his part.l Follow-
ing his break with the Narodovolstv . Plekhanov, together with Vera Zasulitch
and Paul Axelrod established a new party called the Chornv Peredel (liter-
ally, Black Re-distribution). This group insisted upon the necessity of a-
chieving the revolution by the mass action of the workers and the peasants.
The group also disavowed terrorism as a revolutionary taotio and advocated
agitation chiefly on an eoonomic basis among the city workingmen (i. e,,
strikes, walk-outs, etc). 2 The organization existed for only a few months
but it served as a step by which a section of the Narodnlki passed to Marx-
ism and Social-Democracy.
^
Vera Zasulitch 's first revolutionary activity consisted of study and
work in local socialist groups. Early in her revolutionary career her par-
ticipation in a dramatic incident brought her wide publicity among social-
ist groups in Europe and Russia and notoriety among government ciroles in
Russia. In 1873, at the age of 27, she fired a shot at the St. Petersburg
1 Boris Souvarine, A Crltloal Survey of Bolshevism (New York: Alliance
Book Corporation, 1939), p. 30.
2 A. J. Sack, The. Birth of Russian Democracy (New York! Russian Infor-
mation Bureau, 1918), p. 217.
3 Lenin, od,. ci£., p. 27,4.
Governor General, Trepov, for having ordered corporal punishment to be ad-
ministered to an imprisoned revolutionary. She was arrested but freed by
a jury because of popular agitation in her favor. Zasulitch remained in
Russia only long enough to become associated with the Chorny Peredel .1
The early activities of Paul Axelrod followed closely those of many of
the participants in the Narodnilcl movements. In the 1370's he was a follow-
er of the terrorist, Pakunin and was aTested several times while engaging
in illegal propaganda work. Following the split of Narodovolstv he, too,
participated in Chorny Peredel .
In 1830 Plekhanov and his associates attempted to issue a paper under
the title of their organization, Chornv Peredel . The first issue was seized
and the secret printing plant was destroyed by the police. 2 Following this
incident Plekhanov was forced to leave Russia. The next year, 1881, the
assassination of Alexander II was brought about by order of the Warodovolsty
executive committee and consequently the government vigorously orushed or
scattered most of the revolutionary organizations. Zasulitch and Axelrod
escaped persecution by following Plekhanov into Swiss exile where they began
once more to consider revolutionary ideas and activities which had been so
abruptly interrupted in Russia.
The Emancipation of Labor Group
The first two years in exile marked a transitional period for Plekhanov
and his fellow emigres. It was during this time that they came under the
influence of Marxian philosophy and devoted much of their time to a study
of scientific socialism. Just as they had earlier repudiated the principles
1 XM|m p. 306.
2 Sack, op., sit., p. 219.
of Populism aa represented by M^roflnlHlt so they now bes;an to reappraise
the ideas which had provided a foundation for their short-lived Cihorny
Peredel . Partieularly did Plekhanov, who was generally consi lered the
theoretician of the group, begin to oonsider as a fallacy the negation in
Shorny Peredel of the necessity of political struggle. The result of this
reappraisal was that the group adopt«d a Marxian viewpoint without qualifi-
cations.
The first organized expression of this ohange of attitude came in 1883.
During that year Plekhanov, Zasulltoh, and Axelrod, with one other forner
Narodnlkfl, . Leo Deutsch, met in Geneva, owitserland to form an organization
which was to be basically Marxian. The name adopted by the group for their
association was, "Emancipation of Labor". The earliest aim of the group was
chiefly literary. It was hoped that by publishing books and pamphlets which
would be circulated in Russia that Marxian ideas could be disseminated to
help create a conscious working-class movement. During the three years follow-
ing its organize- ' m the "iinancipatlon of Labor group published Jointly a series
of pamphlets entitled, Library of Sonta-ioorarv joclallam. The group also
arranged the publication and distribution of a book by Plekhanov entitled,
:•:':: ': i n ' the, < \ vS", j 'tr-u --i^ . . maltn vt lisM hlek wn HpNMl
in these writings subsequently figured in the ideology of the Russian Soclal-
Demooratio movement. Among them were the oonoept of the leadership of the
working class in the revolutionary movement, the emphasis on the political
nature of the class struggle, and the necessity of the union of the working
class with the peasantry."
1 ma., P. 223.
2 Vfllllan Henry Chamberlin, Soviet Russia ^ A Living Hoaori and a illstory
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933), p. 3/..
At the same time that these literary activities were being carried out
the Emancipation of Labor group was making contacts with European socialists
and participating in the International Sooialist movement. As the group be-
came acquainted with the Marxian Social-Democratic organisations in Prance,
Germany, Switzerland, and England, they established as a primary goal the
foundation of a Social-Democratic organization in Russia which would link
together all Russian socialists in one group devoted to the fighting for a
Marxian revolution. With this object in view the Emancipation of Labor group
began to establish contacts inside Russia. They aided by sending literature
and advice to the clandestine sooialist clubs in the metropolitan areas of
Russia whenever it was possible. During the years 1884 to 1894 Marxian social-
ist clubs became more numerous and worker strikes engineered by the clubs
were more frequent. Particularly was this growth rapid following a pro-
longed famine in Russia during the year 1891. Working from its position in
exile, the Emancipation of Labor group was able to provide some inspiration
and direction to these activities in Russia but very little else. Rather
than being a period of aotion, these ten years represented a time during
which "the theory and the programme of 3ocial-Demooracy germinated and took
root". 2 The number of adherents to the new tendency could have been count-
ed in units and the immediate consequences of the activities of the Emancipation
of Labor group were insignificant when compared with what was to follow,^
As more and more Marxist groups were formed in Russia and among the
1 Souvarine, loc . pit .
2 Lenin, oe, clt .. p. 248.
3 Ibid ., p. 249.
Russian emigres in Switzerland and England, the Emancipation of Labor group
began to recognize the need for a broader, more inclusive organization. Thus
in 1895 the Onion of Russian Social-Democrats was formed in Switzerland through
the initiative of Plekhanov and the Emancipation of Labor group. This action
was considered necessary by Plekhanov for two reasons: first, it was nec-
essary in order to insure that the Emancipation of Labor group would maintain
organizational and theoretical oontrol over the majority of the adherents to
Russian Social-Democracy; and secondly, it was necessary in order to provide
an organization which would include all of the rapidly increasing Russian
Sooial-Democratlo groups. During the years which immediately followed, the
achievements of the new Russian Social-Demooratio organization were at leant
partially seen in the increase of strike activity in Russia which resulted
in the adoption of certain beneficial laws regulating hours of labor. In
1897 all Social-Democratic groups in Europe sent representatives to Zurich
for a Summer Conference. Thti Conference was preoeded by the announcement
of Unions or Sooial-Democratic groups having been established in Kiev, Ekat-
erinoslav, and Moscow. It was also announced at that time that the General
Jewish Workers' Onion in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, had been formed.
The revolutionary movement was especially pronounced in the crowded poverty-
stricken Jewish Pale of Settlement in western and southwestern Russia. There-
fore thi3 last cjroup which was subsequently known as the Bund was a prominent
one in the later revolutionary movement. It provided a high percentage of
the leadership and organized rank and file to Russian Social-Democracy.
Because of these encouraging achievements of Russian socialism a general
spirit of optimism prevailed at the Conference. The delegates were led to
1 Chamberlin, ojj. cit.. p. 35.
consider the establishment of an official Russian oocial-Demooratic party.
Les3 than a year later this was attempted at Minsk inside Russia.
First Party Congress at Minsk
On March 14, 1898, nine Russian socialists met together in convention
at Minsk, a city located by the headwaters of the Niemen river. Their as-
semblage represented the First Congress of Russian Social-Demoeraoy and
their activities were the first official efforts of the party. The composi-
tion of the delegation was as follows: first, there were the adherents to
Social-Democracy who by keeping their Ma-xist work under cover had been able
to remain in Russia. These consisted of members from the Jewish Bund and
delegates from the Unions which had been established in such cities as Kiev,
Moscow, and St. Petersburg; the second group of delegates were of the Legal
Marxist tendency;^- the third were the representatives of the Kmaneipation of
Labor group and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats.
The first business of the Congress was to adopt a party name. The name
adopted was the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party which is usually ab-
breviated as simply the R.S.D.L.P. Next, a manifesto was composed by P. B.
Struve, a Legal Marxist, which was adopted by the Congress as official. The
manifesto outlined the objectives of the party which was being established
at Minsk and specified primarily that the party would adhere to Marxian
During the eighties and nineties government censors were for the most
part unfamiliar with Marxism. They did, however, understand that the Marx-
ists were avowed enemies of the Harodnikl . The censors therefore were prone
to allow the Marxist propaganda to go unchallenged providing that their rev-
olutionary sentiments were not openly expressed. The Marxists who were will-
ing to soften the tone of their writing so that it would pass through the
legal channels of censorship became known as Legal Marxists.
principles and refer to Marx' 3 writings on all fundamental questions of
policy. Ironically enough Peter Struve later performed a complete turn
about in his views, and actively opposed the R.S.D.L.P. to the point of a-
dopting monarchist sentiments.^ The third item of business was the official
recognition of the Bund and the Onion of Russian Social-Democrats. Next
came the establishment of a Central Committee which was elected by the Con-
gress and was to have been the executive organ of the party. The last im-
portant official act of the Congress was that of adopting a Party Organ or
newspaper. In 1397 a group of Social-Democrats in Kiev had printed two is-
sues of a paper called the Rabochava Gazeta (Workers' Newspaper). This
paper was taken over as the all-Russian Central Organ of the party and the
editorial staff for issue number three was appointed by the Congress. The
organizational feature represented by the Central Committee and the Central
Organ whioh was evolved at the Congress is of noteworthy importance. Despite
later vioissitudes which disrupted the party this feature remained essential-
ly unchanged.
After several days the work of the Congress was brought to a slose and
the delegates dispersed to their homes where, as if to provide an ironic cli-
max to their Congress, they were promptly arrested. As frequently happened,
the police had discovered the plans for the supposedly secret revolutionary
Congress and had maintained surveillance over its members from the first day
of meetings. Following the initial arrest of Congress delegates large numbers
of party members in many parts of Russia were also arrested. The usual pen-
alty attached to such political arrests was imprisonment or a term of exile
in Siberia, or sometimes both. Although the government did not completely
1 Chamberlin, oj). pit ., p. 36.
Souvarine, Loe . clt .
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crush Social-Democracy in Russia by the Bass arrests of 1398, the movement
was for a time severely hampered. The principal efforts of the First Party
Congress had been wiped out. The Central Committee ceased to exist almost
before it had its ohanoe to function and all thought of publishing a Central
Organ was temporarily set aside. Then, too, many of the key members of the
Russian Social-Democratic organizations had been among those arrested and
the burden of organization onee again shifted to the emigre circles of Europe
who could not hope to accomplish much at such distance. In November, 1898,
a congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats was held in Europe to
surrey the situation in Russia and to determine means by whioh the lost ground
oould be regained. It was not, however, until two years following this Con-
gress that conditions a»ain began to seem more favorable to large scale Social-
Democratic activities in Russia. By 1900 the opportunities for redeeming the
abortive organizational attempt of the First Party Congress began to appear
closer to the grasp of those who would take them. In the months following
the turn of the century, three young Russians, V. I. Lenin, I. 0. Martov,
and A. H. Potresov, returned from Siberian exile and in recognizing the op-
portunities and acting upon the needs of the hour became important figures
in subsequent Social-Demooratio activities.
The Toung Leaders, Lenin, Martov, and Potresov
A new generation of revolutionary Intellectuals in the two decades
preceding the turn of the century <^*ew up under the influence of Marxism
and Social-Democracy. Among the most Important of these as judged by the
standard of later developments was V. I. Lenin. His real name was Vladimir
Ilyioh Ulianov but by his twenty-fifth year he had adopted the name Lenin
for conspiratorial reasons. In his writings he adopted several different
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signatures; sometimes N. Lenin,* and occasionally, "The Old Man", or simply,
Petroff.
Lenin was born on April 22, 1870 in the central Russian provinoe of
Simbirsk. Both of his parents were reasonably well educated for the time
and Lenin had the benefits of both a formal education and a hone atmosphere
which was oonduoive to study. By the time Lenin had finished high school
he was already keenly interested in socialistic ideas. Through friends he
had access to the pamphlets of the ananeipation of Labor group and at the
Simbirsk library he was able to peruse the writingr of some of the Legal
Marxists. He also was acquainted with the Populist literature of the Harod-
nikl through his older brother, Alexander, who was an active member of that
organization. Lenin had apparently definitely determined on a career of
socialism and revolution by 1887. That year he entered the Kazan University
as a law student. While at the University he established contacts with social-
ist student groups and In December of the same year he was expelled for par-
ticipation in student disturbances. After his expulsion Lenin spent several
months at his grandfather's estate in Kazan provinoe. Here for the first
time he had access to Marx's Capital which he avidly studied. In the mean-
time his brother Alexander had been apprehended in an unsuccessful attempt
to assassinate Czar Alexander III. Alexander Dlianov was later hanged. These
two oircumstanees; first, the reading of the scholarly and convincing Capital
and secondly, the effect of his brother "3 death whloh made him realize the
futility of individual aots of terror as advanoed by the Narodnikl . had, it
1 Contrary to common belief the "N." did not stand for Hicholai or
Nicholas. It was common practioe for Russian printers to use the Russian letter
"H" (N) to indicate that a pseudonym followed. Lenin probably adopted the "M.
"
for that reason.
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ay be presumed, a great deal to do with Lenin's deciding to become a Marx-
ist.
From the year 1887 until his exile ten years later, Lenin was vigor-
ously active in Marxist work. During this period he participated in a number
of Social-Democratic study groups and eonduoted a wide correspondence with
the Emancipation of Labor group and other Sooial-Demoeratio organizations
in western Europe. In 1891 Lenin was allowed to take the University law
examinations as an external student of the St. Petersburg University. He
passed these and was admitted to the bar in September, 1893. In 1394 Lenin
Joined a Social-Democratic circle in St. Petersburg of which he soon became
one of the leaders. During this same year he published illegally his first
literary work. It was a polemic directed against the Harodniki and was en-
titled, J3io Jjhe. ' Friends of the. People ' are and How Thev Fight Against Jhe.
3oaial-0eaocrats . In 1895 Lenin travelled abroad for four months. In west-
ern Europe he beoame per?onally acquainted with Plekhanov, Zasulitch, and
Axelrod of the Emancipation of Labor f»roup and through them made arrangements
for the transporting of illegal literature to Russia. Upon returning to
St. Petersburg he helped organize the "Union of Struggle for the Liberation
of the Working Class", a local Social-Democratic organization. As has been
mentioned, similar Unions sprang up in Kiev, Moscow, and elsewhere. During
the fall of 1895 the Union began to agitate and propagandize among the work-
ers of St. Petersburg. To facilitate these functions preparations were made
for the publication of an illegal newspaper to be called, Raboohava Delo
(The VJorkers* Cause). Unfortunately for the members of the Union their ef-
forts were discovered by the police and on December 9, 1895 Lenin and other
Dnionists were arrested and imprisoned.
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Fop Lenin the arrest was not without Its advantages. It gave hin un-
disturbed periods of tine which he oould devote to study and writings. As
frequently happened, however, the period in prison was soon followed by a
three year exile to eastern Siberia. The exile prolonged the psriod during
which L*nln was out of the main stream of revolutionary activity and severely
hampered his ambitions. Despite the limitations on travel and communications,
Lenin's exile was not very oppressive. Re was able to maintain secret con-
tact with some Russian Social-Democrats and particularly the Emancipation of
Labor nroup which to hin was very important. He was allowed such freedom
that he received most of the books and newspapers which he requested and
occasionally was permitted to contribute articles to the Russian Legal Marx-
ist Journals.
While In exile he was able to write a number of pamphlets which were
mainly direoted against the ideology of the Narodnlkl and also to complete
his fir3t book entitled, The Development of Capitalism ig Russia . The book
was a scholarly account of economic developments in Russia, It followed
strictly the Marxist dialectical pattern and so was very well reoeived among
Russian Social-Democrats. During his exile Lenin also translated Sidney and
Beatrice Webb's, Theory and Practice of Trade Unionism. This he did with
the help of Natasha K. Krupskaya, who as an arrested member of the St. Peters-
burg "Union" was sent into exile a few months after Lenin had been, and who
while in Siberia was married to Lenin in a civil ceremony. As the end of
Lenin's period of exile grew nearer Social-Democratic organisational ideas
1 Blisabeth Hill and Doris Mudie, The. Letters of Lenin (New York:
Haroourt, Brace and Company, 1937), p. 71.
uand plans absorbed his time more and more. He began to define his own part
in these plans and by correspondence discussed thee with two Social-Democrat-
ic friends, I. 0. Martov and A. N. Potresov who were also In exile.
Martov was three years younger and Potresov was a year older than Lenin,
As was Lenin, both Martov and Potresov were a part of the younger Russian in-
tellectuals who felt an affinity to Social-Democratic ideas and looked to
westorn Europe and the Emancipation of Labor group for inspiration and guid-
ance in theoretical matters. Martov, whose real name was T. 0. Tsederbaum,
had become interested in sooialism after observing the effects of the famine
of 1891. In 1895 he participated in the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle
as a member and became a close friend of Lenin's. Following the debacle of
the "Union" Martov was also exiled although to a different part of Siberia
from Lenin. Lenin and Martov retained their close friendship through a
correspondence which was carried on during their years in exile.
Like Mirtov, A. H. Potresov (not a pseudonymn) began his revolutionary
work during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Although he too
participated in the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle he managed to avoid
arrest until 1898. At that time he was banished to northern Russia for two
years. There he too carried on a correspondence with Social-Deaooratio
friends in exile.
In the early months of the same year, 1900, these three were given their
freedom and they soon gravitated toward each other. During their years in
arrsst their common purposes and future ambitions had become dear to each,
A glorious future for Russian Social-Democracy was their goal and each had
agreed to devote his major efforts to the attainment of that goal. Through
correspondence and discussions they had determined that the first action which
15
should be taken by them upon release from exile would be the establish-
ment of a Russian Sooial-Denooratie newspaper. Such a newspaper they felt
would provide an organ around which a suooessful Russian Marxist party
eould be built. The establishment of suoh a newspaper comprises the text
of the next chapter.
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CHAFTKR II
THK FOUNDING OF ISKRA
Objectives and Tasks of the Party Organ
The time spent in exile by the young Social-Democrats, Lenin, Potresov,
and Martov were years during which they found it impossible to work aotively
in the Sooial-Domoeratic movement. They were forbidden by the terms of their
exile to participate in group meetings or travel from one town to another
without permission from the Russian government. All the details of their
lives were under the surveillance of the distriot police and all their cor-
respondence was censored. Their contacts vlth socialist activities were se-
cret ones and usually maintained only through the expedient of letters to
relatives. These letters would contain messages written in code or in chem-
icals which rendered the message invisible. The secret portion of the let-
ter would be forwarded by the relative to its intended destination. Naturally
enough this method of entering into Social-Democratic activity was both time-
consuming and risky and so was resorted to very irregularly. The many limita-
tions imposed on the exiled tended to direct them away *"rom practical action
to the studies which involved the theoretical or philosophical problems of
3oci il-Democracy. In spite of this academic tendency, howevsr, it may be as-
sumed from later events that Lenin, Potresov, and Ifartov never entirely ceased
to consider the possibilities for future practical activity. Their desire
to found a Russian Social-Democratio newspaper is an important evidence of
this interest in practical problems and practical solutions. It may easily
be imagined that most of their reasons for wanting such a newspaper had been
at least mentally decided upon in the months preoeding their release from
17
exile early In 1900,1 It was not, however, until September of that year
that In a formal declaration those reasons were set down In printed forn.
The author of the declaration was Lenin but it wag written with the apparent
approval and consent of all who were direotly oonoerncd with the project.
Copies of the declaration were circulated among the socialists in western
Europe and Russia. As outlined In the declaration, the two major objectives
which (it was hoped) would gradually be fulfilled by the newspaper were to
strengthen and stratify the ideological "oundation of the movement and to
consolidate all local Russian Social-Democratic groups Into one effeotive
organization. Neither objective could be easily met. The disruptive in-
fluence of police arrests an! the lack of consistent leadership in the lecade
following 1890 had so disorganized the party that In 1900 Lenin was forced
to make the following statement in his declaration
i
The principal feature of our movement, and one which has become
particularly marked in reoent times is its state of disunity and its
primitive character. ... Local circles spring up and function in-
dependently of one another ... even el roles which have functioned
and now function simultaneously in the sane district. Traditions are
not established and continuity Is not maintained.
. .
.3
What unity thore was in the movement was provided by the acceptance of
common ideal3 but even here the pioture was not a bright one. Prior to 1900
a number of different tendencies htir! developed within 3oolal-Demooracy which
wore for the most part non-Marxian and anti-revolutionary. Their adoption
by some groups and rejection by others simply added to the confusion already
1 S. K. Krupskayft. ".asories of I.enln (1393-1917 ) (London! Lawrence
and Wishart Ltd., V)/U), p. 27.
2 This declaration In its oomplete form is included in the Appendix.
3 See Appendix.
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oreatod by arrests and exiles. A debating 30olety atmosphere developed and
the practical activities of the party were negleoted or forgotten altogether.
In the following excerpt from the same declaration Lenin surveyed the
plight of the Russian Soeial-Dnmocratio party and outlined the two objectives
already mentioned:
In the first place, it is necessary to bring about unity of ideas
which will remove the differences of opinion and confusion that—we will
be frank—reign among Russian Social-Democrats at the present time.
This unity of idea3 must be fortified by a unified party programme.
Secondly, an organization must be set up especially for the purpose of
maintaining contact among all the centres of the movement, for supply-
ing complete and timely information about the movement, and for regular-
ly distributing the periodical press to all parts of Russia. To this
task ... (of) creating a common literature, consistent in principle
and capable of ideologically uniting revolutionary Social-Democracy, we
intend to devote our efforts. . . .1
The newspaper was expected to have certain characteristics and functions
which would best suit it to meet the two main objectives set as a goal. First,
it was considered necessary to open the newspaper to all polemical discussions
from contributors. In regard to this Lenin stated:
We desire our publications to become organs for the discussion of
all questions by all Russian Social-Democrats of the most diverse shades
of opinion. ... Open polemics conducted in the sight and hearing of
all Russian Social-Democrats and class conscious workers, are necessary
and desirable in order to explain the profoundness of the differences
that exist. ... We think it necessary to try to make our publications
organs of general democracy.
. .
.2
It must not be assumed, however, that this "democracy" was without its restric-
tions. Actually while all points of view were to be invited, the editors
were to reserve their right to publish what they considered to be most de-
sirable from their own special viewpoint. Lenin expressed this when he said
that the "organ (should have) a definite tendency ... rather than being a
1 See Appendix.
2 Lenin, op., cit., book 1, p. 20.
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jumble of various views". * The democracy planned for the newspaper, then,
was not all it would seem to be at first glance.
Secondly, it was desired that the newspaper be devoted to literature
common to the whole party rather than to items of only local interest. Third-
ly, the newspaper was to act as a rallying point for establishing and main-
taining contacts among all the local groups of the movement. And lastly, it
was to be a propaganda instrument devoted to attracting the masses of work-
ers and intellectuals to the movement and to bind the existing Social-Demo-
cratic groups under one set of ideas.
I3kra and Zarva
The first concrete steps toward realizing these objectives centered a-
round a party organ were taken soon after Lenin, Martov, and Potresov were
released from exile. I^enin was the first to be given his freedom. On Jan-
uary 30, 1900 Lenin was allowed to leave the village of his exile, Shushen-
skoye, Siberia. The police had forbidden him to live in St. Petersburg and
Moscow, or any of the industrial centers in Russia so he decided upon Pskov,
a city south-west of St. Petersburg, for his temporary headquarters. 2 On his
way to Pskov, Lenin stopped for a few days each in Ufa and Moscow where ha
made contacts with members of the active Social-Democratic groups in these
areas. On February 26 Lenin arrived at Pskov. He immediately began to es-
tablish connections and start negotiations with various Social-Democratic
groups and individual Social-Democrats in Pskov and elsewhere, to secure sup-
port for the projected newspaper. In early March, Lenin left Pskov to take
\ Ibid., P. 19.
* Marx-Engels-L
and. Activities (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 19451, p. 56
2 enin Institute, V. I. Lenin, A Brief Sketch of Jjlg Life
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part in a meeting with Vera Zasulitch of the "Emancipation of Labor group.
Zasulitch had entered Russia illegally in 1899 and was living in disguise
in St, Petersburg. At this meeting she assured Lenin of the full support
of her group in the newspaper venture.
While Lenin was in Northern Russia Martov had traveled from exile to
the oity of Poltava to make contacts in the South. By the middle of March,
Lenin had returned to Pskov from St. Petersburg and Martov and Potresov had
Joined him. During the two months that followed Pskov became the center
of aotivity directed toward the establishment of the newspaper. The first
official action toward the realization of that goal was taken in the last
of March at what was called the "Pskov Conference".
Present at the Conference in addition to Lenin, Martov, and Potresov
were representatives of Legal Marxism, Peter Struve, the author of the Mani-
festo of the First Congress, and B. Turgan-Baranovsky. although both Struve
and Turgan-Baranovsky had in practice already definitely broken away from
Marxism, they expressed their sympathy for the suggestion of founding a Social-
Democratic newspaper of organizational-wide scope. 2 During the first few days
of the Conference it was thought that the Rabochaya Gazeta . which had been
adopted as the Central Organ by the II r I Congress of the party, might be
revived. After conversations with representatives of the Jewish Bund of Kiev
who had been the original mjblishera of the Gazeta it was decided in order
to escape any previous policy commitments that the projected paper would be
entirely new and original. An editorial statement which had been drafted by
1 Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a '{evolution (New Tork: Dial Press,
1948), p. K7.
2 Lenin, p£. pit., p. 75.
Lenin, on the pro "ram of the future newspaper wag discussed and later a-
dopted. It later reached printed form as the Declaration which has already
discussed. After a discussion of the aims and objectives, it was decided
that the newspaper should be established abroad so as to escape destruction
by the Russian police. The final activity of the Conference was to Invite
the participation of the ESnanoipation of Labor group, since Lenin from his
conversations with Vera Zasulltch knew that that group desired to partici-
pate in the founding and operation of the newspaper.*
Immediately following the Conference Potresov left Pskov for Germany
to get into touch with Plekhanov and the •Saanoipation of Labor group,
Potresov not only was to contact that jproup in regard to thpir support but
also to find out from the German Social-Democrats, Adolf Braun and Clara
Zetkin whether it would be possible secretly to print the newspaper in Ger-
many. 2 Lenin and Martov, bolstered by the actions of the Conference, spent
another month in Russia visiting party workers in such cities as Riga, Podolsk,
Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Kazan, and 3amara.3 The contacts which were made later
proved invaluable when the paper was actually put into operation. On May 5,
Lenin finally received his passport to go abroad but he rathar foolishly
decided to remain in Russia another month. On May 20 in a reo*le33 visit
to 3t. Petersburg, a city forbidden to both, Martov and Lenin were arrested.
Lenin had on his person two thousand rubles which he had collected Trom
supporters of the newspaper project, a list of ad-tresses, and other incrimi-
nating evidence pointing to the illegal enterprise. E&r rare good fortune
1
i22. pit .
2 Hill and lludie, s&, oi£., p. 103.
3 Marx-"vngels-I.enin Institute, Of. ail., p. 52.
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he was not searohed and they vere only detained Tor ten days. After their
release from prison Martov returned to southern Russia and Lenin went to
Podolsk, near Moscow, obstensibly to visit his mother, but primarily to con-
tinue negotiations there with a number of Social-Democrats regarding more
financial support for the future newspaper.
On July 16, Lenin left Russia. He first traveled through Germany, stop-
ping only long enough to establish acquaintances among important German Jooial-
ttemoorats there. Upon reaching Zurich, Switzerland around the middle of
August Lenin contacted Axelrod of the '^mancipation of Labor group and a lit-
tle later found living quarters with Potresov in the village of Vezenas,
near Geneva. Prom the 11th to the 15th of August an important conference
took place at Corsier (near Geneva) between Lenin, Potresov, Plekhanov,
Axelrod, and Za3ulitch during which plans for publishing the future news-
paper were discussed. ^ Following the conference Lenin, Potresov, and Zasuliteh
left for Germany. By the 24-th of August technical preparations for printing
the paper were almost complete and the editorial board had been established
at Munich where the paper was to be published. On December 11 the first is-
sue of the newspaper which had gradually assumed form over a three year
period was published.
Although the editorial staff was in Munich the first issues of the news-
paper were printed in Leipzig. The reasons for this obviously inconvenient
separation were probably conspiratorial. Even in Germany away from the Rus-
sian police, such precautions to insure the secrecy of the effort were con-
1 Wolfe, 2E. clt.. p. 141.
2 Ernfried Sduard Kluge, Tie russische revolutionsre Pres3e en der
zweiten Halfte des neunzehnten Jahrhun'erts . 1355-1905 (Zurich; Artemis
Verlag, 1949), p. 150.
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sidered necessary. The name adopted for the newspaper upon Lenin's sug-
gestion was Iskra (The Spark)1 . The title was taken from a poem by Prince
0doev3ky who as a member of the Decembrist movement of the early nineteenth
century was in exile in Siberia. One of Russia's greatest poets, Alexander
S. Pushkin had written a poem to commemorate the hardships sustained by the
exiled Decembrists. In the poem which Prinoe Odoevsky wrote in reply to
Pushkin was the line, "The spark shall burst in burning flame". 2 By adopt-
ing "Iskra " as the name for their newspaper, the editors meant to take advan-
tage of the emotional value of the word which to many implied an optimistic
future.-'
1 Iskra: Tsentralvni Organ Rosallskal jotslal-demokratlcheskal Rabochei
Party)
Partll
.
(The Spark: Central Organ of the Russian Sooial-Democratic Labor
2 The two poems follow, taken from: Julius F. Heoker, Moscow Dialogues .
Di3oussion3 on Rgd. Philosophy (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1933), pp. 48-9.
Message to Siberia , by Alexander Pushkin
"Deep in the Siberian mine,
Keep your patience proud,
The bitter toil shall not be lost,
The Rebel thought unbowed.
"The heavy-hanging chains will fall,
The wall3 will crumble at the word,
And Freedom greet you with the light,
And brothers give you back the sword."
A Reply to Pushkin , by Prince Oioevsky
"Cur bitter toil shall not be lost,
The soark shall burst £rj burning flame:
Our loyal godly Russian host,
Shall gather round our banners name.
Our chains we shall forge into swords;
Again to blaze with them the Tsar's cohorts,
With joy the people shall respire."
3 Frederiok Lewi3 Schuman, Soviet Politics at itome and Abroad (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 36.
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The first copies of Iskra printed at Leipzig were secretly produced
on small secret presses owned by H. W, Diets. Dietz was a German Social-
Democrat and as owner of a large printing plant, he published Sooial-Demo-
oratio literature of all types including the most important works of the
Marxist writers in Russia. Although the main printing establishment owned
by Dietz was located at 3tuttgart it was at first considered too ri3ky to
attempt the printing of iBkra there. However, secret facilities were soon
set up in Stuttgart and the printing operation was transferred from Leipzig
to Dietz' main plant where it remained until the middle of 1902,
The editorial board of Iskra oonsisted of Lenin, Martov, who arrived
from Russia late in 1900, Potresov, Zasulitch, Plekhanov, and Axelrod.*
As has already been mentioned, the first four took up residence at Munich
following the April conference near Geneva. Plekhanov remained at his home
in Switzerland md Axelrod remained in Zurich. The latter two maintained
contact with the Munich editors by correspondence and by an occasional trip
to Germany. The composition of the editorial board remained the same until
the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Demooratio Party in 1903. However,
their place of residence changed, first, in early 1903 when the editorial
board moved to London, and later that 3ame year when it was transferred to
Geneva.
Soon after the first copies of Iskra had been printed, the same editor-
ial board established a second publication called the Zarva (Dawn). As was
the Iskra . Zarya was printed in Stuttgart on the equipment owned by H. W.
Dietz. The first issue appeared on March 10, 1901. The Zarva differed from
1 Wolfe, op., fiit., p. 150.
25
the Iskra in the purpose for which it had been published. IJhereas the
Iskra was essentially a newspaper devoted to agitation and popular issues,
the Zarva was intended to be a propaganda Journal. Its pages were devoted
to discussions of theoretical subjects and articles which dealt with science
and politics; particularly Marxian soienee. The subject concerning the num-
ber of issues of Iskra and Zarva which were published will be taken up in
the next chapter, but it may be noted that many more issues of Iskra were
published than of Zarva .
*
The mere founding of Iskra and Zarva represented the removal of a major
obstacle to the aspirations of the group of editors. Without publications
for propaganda and agitation, they could hardly hope to exert much influence.
But to found a newspaper was one thing, and to keep its parts smoothly co-
ordinated was another. Dissension among the editors, some of which became
apparent even before the first issue of l3kra had come from the press, threat-
ened with some frequency to wreok the whole venture.
Early Conflicts Among the Editors of Iskra and Zarva
In the ranks of the editors of Iskra there were three types of conflicts!
those which were essentially irrational and created through personality dif-
ferences; those which centered around the internal problems of managing Iskra :
and lastly those which arose through disagreements on the attitudes which
Iskra should adopt toward other newspapers and other political groups. It
is difficult to isolate completely the first type of oonfliot from the other
two because of its irrational basis. How often stands were taken as they
were or issues decided one way or another owing to conflicting personalities
1 Lenin, 22. cit., p. 322.
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It would be impossible to say. In an analysis of the conflicts among the
Islcra editors this factor must remain the unknown quantify which can be
hinted and guessed at but cannot be proved.
Internal conflicts commenced on almost the first day that Lenin ar-
rived at Geneva In August of 1900.1 The only published aooount of these
events is Lenin's, written the month after the August meetings under the
title, JjQy. JJu 3nark Vha Beerlv Extinguished. Although, quite naturally,
the aooount given is biased it appears to be exhaustive and hence may be
assumed to be fairly oonplete even though probably not quite aoourate.
The first disagreement at the Geneva Conference oonoerned the policy
to bo adopted in the future Islcra toward polemics and the participation of
other socialist and liberal tendencies. It will be remembered that Lenin
was nourishing the idea that the Islcra could be everybody's paper, could
have working allies, and 3tlll maintain a definite "tereJeney'' or editorial
consistency. 2 George Plekhanov, during the early sessions of the Conference
took issue with this viewpoint whioh had been written in Lenin's Draft
Declaration o£ Iakra and Zarva. It was his contention that polemics from
opposing tendencies should not be printed by Islcra. Plekhanov' s attitude
toward this point and also the general tone of his conduct Is brought out
in the following excerpt from Lenin's aooount of the Conference:
A heated discussion arose over the question ... (of) polemics.
G. V, (Plekhanov) opposed (them) ... and absolutely refused to listen
to our arguments. He displayed a hatred toward ^allies" that border-
ed on the indecent (suspeotlng them of espionage, accusing them of
being Gasohaftmaaher (swindlers) and rogues, and asserting that he
1 Marx-Hngels-Lenin Institute, 0£, ali., P. 56.
2 Wolfe, as. ali., p. K9.
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would not hesitate to "shoot" such "traitors," etc.
. .
.1
After taking issue with this part of the content of Lenin's draft
Plekhanov, vho inoidently was a skilled and clever writer, began to criticize
the style in which the declaration was written. He felt that it lacked
depth and had a pedestrian tone. He expressed the de3ire to alter the style
and give it a higher tone. 3uoh a suggestion would not be calculated to
create any great amount of good feeling between the two future editors.
As the days passed, the rift between Lenin and Potresov on the one hand,
and the ISraanoipation of Labor group headed by Plekhanov on the other, became
wider. Toward the end of the Conference quarrels developed over very minor
points which normally would be expected to have no signlfioanoe in the face
of the outstanding goal which was being considered. This pettiness is well
illustrated by Lenin's adamant opposition to the commissioning of one author
to write one. article to appear in Iskra . Of this incident Lenin said:
G. V. proposed that a certain person (who had not yet contributed
anything to literature but in whom G. V. pretends to see philosophical
talent; I have never seen this person—but she is known for her blind
worship of G. V.), be commissioned to write an article on a philosophi-
cal subject.
. .
.2
As the relations among the members of the group steadily worsened
Plekhanov brought matters to an abrupt climax by announcing that he would
serve as merely a contributor rather than as an editor. He 3tated that "it
was evident that our views differed
. . .
(and) otherwise there would be
continual friction. "3 Despite Lenin and Potresov's disagreements with
1 Lenin, 0£. ait., p. 23.
2 Jbid., p. 27.
3 Loc. pit.
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Plekhanov they were not prepared for this surprising change. Plekhanov was
older and at that tine much more experienced in Social-Democratic matters
than either Lenin or Potresov. They vere unwilling to risk their talents
on a newspaper ventiire without the active support and advice of one with
Plekhanov' s experience. They began to argue against the suggestion. Ap-
parently, Plekhanov had understood before he made the suggestion what the
consequenoes would be. At any rate, he took strategic advantage of the po-
sition in which he found himself, and agreed to be an editor of the future
publication only if he be allowed two votes (the other five, Lenin, Martov,
Potresov, Axe^rod, and Zasulitoh were to be given one vote apiece). In the
face of the threat of losing Plekhanov altogether Lenin and Potresov quick-
ly agreed to this. However, they soon regretted their action as Lenin in-
dicated in the following!
On that (after being given two votes) G. V. took the reins of
management in his hands and in a high editorial manner began to ap-
portion tasks for the journal ... we sat there as if we had been
ducked.
. . .
.My infatuation with Plekhanov disappeared as if by
magic, and I f&lt offended and imbittered to the highest degree. 1
Following the meeting which had ended so successfully for Plekhanov,
Lenin and Potresov returned to their rooms stinging from the knowledge that
their position as editors of the future newspaper had been undermined by
their hasty action. Plekhanov with two votes apparently planned to be dic-
tator over the entire plan. The next morning further discussions and argu-
ments took plaoe and Lenin was on the verge of saying, "Good-bye, journal
!
We will throw up everything and return to Russia. There we will start all
over a^ain, right from the beginning.
. .
.".2 Lenin's plan to leave for
1 Loo. olt.
2 Ibld . f p. 30
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Russia, however, was never carried through. Later in the day the two other
members of the Emancipation of Labor group, Vera Zasulitoh and Paul Axelrod
convinced him that it would still be possible to work with Plekhanov. Later
that same week, Lenin and Potresov had another interview with Plekhanov at
which time "he adopted a tone as if to suggest that all that had happened
was a sad misunderstanding due to irritability . . .". 1 Plekhanov gave way
on the question of polemics and instructed Lenin to draw up a plan of the
formal relations which were to exist among the editors.
This draft agreement was written soon after Lenin and the other editors
left for Munich. The typewritten draft dated October 6 is in the Archives
of the Lenin Institute at Moscow and is apparently, in the main, the work
of Lenin. 2
The quarrels which developed at the conference and which were obsten-
slbly settled amicably presaged later personal conflicts among the editors.
In the majority of the later conflicts as with those at the conference the
older editors, Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasnliteh were in opposition to the
\ Lild... p. 35.2 The following which is the text of the agreement was taken from!
Ibid . . p. 317.
(1) The Compendium Zarya and the newspaper Iskra shall be published and
edited by the Russian Social-Democrat group with the editorial participation
of the Emancipation of Labor group.
(2) The editorial board shall submit all articles dealing with principles
and which are of a particularly serious nature to all the members of the Eman-
cipation of Labor group if editorial and technical conditions permit of that
being done.
(3) The members of the Emancipation of Labor group 3hall vote on all
editorial questions.
. . .
(A) In the event of differences arising with the Emancipation of Labor
group, the editors undertake to publish in their entirety the opinions of
the group as a whole, or of each member individually.
(5) Only the first point of this agreement shall be made public
30
younger editors. With twenty years of exile back of them the older members
looked upon Iskra and Zarva as a literary undertaking above all else.
Plekhanov was a revolutionary skeptic and Axelrod and Za3ulitoh did not
consider organisational and tactical questions very important. On the other
hand Lenin and the younger editors thought of l3kra and Zarva as important
instruments for bringing about immediate revolutionary action.1 This basic
difference in viewpoint between the two groups made editorial aohesiveness
difficult and represented a major source of friction. This difference in
viewpoint which went vtnanalyzed (gradually widened the oha3m between the
two groups and their clashes *had a sharpness out of all proportion to the
issues". 2
The decision to establish the editorial board at Munich in preparation
for the first issue of Iskra was not made without some quarrelling. Both
Plekhanov and Axelrod wanted the editorial board to be set up somewhere in
Switzerland. In opposing this, Lenin considered it necessary "for Iskra
to b<s somewhat apart from the emigrant center (which Geneva had become) and
that it should be run secretly. ".3 Actually the issue was probably based on
the desire of each group to maintain as much control as possible over the
policies of Iskra . the assumption being that if the editorial board were in
Munich it would be difficult for Plekhanov and Axelrod, who spent most of
their time in Switzerland, to be very effective. That the editorial board
was moved to Munich over the disapproval of the older editors was probably
because they didn't object very much. At first the whole venture wasn't
1 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 193277 P. 156.
2 Wolfe, <£>. clt . . p. 166.
3 Quotation fromi N. K. Krupskaya, orj. clt .. p. 36.
31
considered very important by them. N. K. Krupslcaya implied this when she
quoted Vera Zasulitchi "'Tour Iskra is silly,' Vera Ivanovna said, Jokingly
at the beginning. This it is true wa3 only said for fun, but it revealed
a certain underestimation of the whole enterprise."1 This attitude is also
brought out by the apathy which went with the obvious political move of Lenin
making his wife, N. K. Krupskaya, the secretary of Iskra early in 1901. This,
of oourse, meant that Lenin and the younger editors would be able to exer-
cize much control over the flow of correspondence. The Bnanoipatlon of Labor
group did not put up their own candidate for the position which seems to
indicate that they did not attach much importance to Iskra at the time.
As the influence of Iskra began to grow, the agitation to return to
Switzerland became more frequent. The question of location onoe again be-
came a major issue in the early months of 1902. At that time both the Ger-
man and the Csarist police obtained clues to the whereabouts of Iskra 's
headquarters and it became imperative to leave Germany. Both Plekhanov and
Axelrod favored moving to Switzerland but the remainder of the editors voted
for London. After almost a year at London another vote was taken and Just
prior to the Second Congress of the Party the editorial board was moved to
Geneva. The vote had been five to one with Lenin casting the only dissenting
vote. Lenin was so over-wrought with the thought of losing his editorial
independence from Plekhanov and Axelrod that he was reported to have develop-
ed a nervous illness called shingles. 2 Usually a minimum of ill-feeling re-
sulted over the disagreements on locations for the editorial board of Iskra .
1 Loo., pit
.
2 Ibid.., p. 63.
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Suoh was not the case In the conflict which resulted from Lenin's sponsor-
ship of a young Social-Democrat, Leon Trotsky.
Trotsky, whose family name was Bronstein, was the son of a wealthy
Jewish landholder. At the age of twenty he had been exiled to Siberia and
while in exile he heard of the activities of the Iskra organization. Early
in 1902, after his release from exile he joined an Iskra group in Samara.
As a tribute to some of his Siberian journalistic efforts he was nioknamed
Pero (Pen). This became his official organizational name. During this time
he was a fervent supporter of l3kra and "produced a very good impression
on everybody"1 connected with Iskra at Samara. In the Autumn of 1902 it
wa3 decided that Trotsky should be sent from Russia to London where his a-
bilities as a journalist could be used to their best advantage. A number of
exciting and amusing incidents happened to Trotsky on that trip to London.
He was nearly caught at a railroad station near the Russian border, and later
he was hidden in a room only to find that the oocupant, who wa3 not an Iskra
sympathizer, was not out of town as he was supposed to be, but was still in
the room.2 At the border his arrangements for crossing temporarily backfired
when his smuggler discovered that Trotsky was an Iskra adherent. It develop-
ed that the smuggler had taken offense at some of the remarks concerning
terror as a revolutionary instrument in a recent issue of Iskra . Only after
much supplication did the man consent to carry Trotsky across the border.3
Upon arriving in London, Trotsky first visited Lenin and his wife who then
found him a room with Martov and Blumenfeld, the Iskra printing press manager.4
1 Ibid,., p. 59.
2 Leon Trotsky, ffc Life (New York! Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1930), p. 137.
3 Loc.. clt .
1 IMd., P. 1U.
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Trotsky soon found a place in the Iskra activities at London. He
assisted in the editorial work of the paper and soon wa3 writing articles
and short polemios for Iskra . the first of 3uch works being a short piece
commemorating the two-hundred year Jubilee of the Sohlusselburg fortresa.l
Trotsky '8 abilities as a writer and orator made an immediate impression on
the emigres circles in Brussels, Liege, and Paris where he was sent to
leoture on Social-Democracy. His ea>:»mess as a student and as an impas-
sioned follower of Iskra devotod him to Lenin and they soon became close
friends. 2
Four months after Trotsky' 3 arrival in London Lenin wrote to Plekhanov
suggesting that Trotsky be co-opted as a seventh member of the editorial
board. A part of the letter is included below:
I suggest to all the members of the editorial board that they
co-optate 'Pero' as a member of the board on the same basis as other
members. I believe co-optation demands not merely a majority of votes,
but a unanimous decision. We very much need a seventh member, both
as a convenience in voting (six being an even number) and as an addition
to our forces. 'Pero' has been contributing to everr issue for several
months now; he works in general most energetically for the Iskra : he
gives lectures (in which he has been very successful). In the section
of artioles and note3 on the events of the day, he will not only be
very useful, but absolutely necessary. Unquestionably a man of rare
abilities, he has conviction and energy, and he will go much farther.
furthermore, in the field of translations and of popular literature he
will be able to do a groat deal.
. .
.3
The remainder of the letter considered possible objections to Trotsky such
as his youth, his exce33ively florid style of writing, and the possibility
of his leaving for Russia shortly. In a post-script to the letter Lenin
stated that he thought it extremely likely that any dolay in this co-optation
1 Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 12.
2 3ouvarine, ojj. cj£., p. U5.
3 This letter quoted from: Trotsky, I£ Life , p. 152.
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would so offend Trotsky as to lose him from the organization entirely.
Trotsky in his writings denied this assumption of Lenin's as being without
foundation and this denial affirms the existence of an atmosphere of in-
trigue among the editors at this time. Lenin's resort to suoh a pressure
taatio as was involved in the post-soript statement is oharaoteristio of
the situation in London. Ten days later Martov wrote Axelrod seconding
Lenin's proposal but this was merely a part of the lining up on sides; the
older editors on one, and the younger editors on the other. Plekhanov em-
phatically opposed Lenin's motion, lie took it as a personal affront that
Lenin would propose a mere boy of twenty-three for the editorial board of
Islcra
.
He reminded Lenin of the dual vote which had been given him at the
Geneva Conference. Bven though Plekhanov had never taken advantage of the
dual vote, he took this opportunity to assure the other editors that he
still considered himself the possessor of that voting right,1 After bitter
discussion Plekhanov proposed that the reorganizing of the editorial board
be delayed until the Second Congress of the Party which was several months
in the future. 3ince oo-optating could only be done by unanimous agreement
of the editors, Lenin's proposal was blocked. After that, even though
Trotsky had not been made an editor he was brought to the editorial meetings
by Lenin and Vera Zasulitch.2 Although he was not given a vote, Trotsky's
presence at the meetings further vexed Plekhanov.
Lenin probably had at least three reasons for proposing Trotsky's co-
optation to the editorial board, even though he undoubtedly realized that
his action would add to the tension already felt among the editors. The
1 Wolfe, 0£. oit.
,
p. 218.
2 Log. cit.
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first reason was probably baser! on a genuine regard for the abilities of
Trotsky and a desire to see those abilities usei to the best advantage of
Iglcra . Secondly, since Plekhanov had never asserted his right to a dual
vote Lenin probably aonsidered it invalid. Voting frequently ended in a
tie with Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasulltoh on the one side, and Lenin,
Martov, and Potresov on the other. All of the editors found this tie pos-
sibility vexatious and Lenin saw in the eo-optation of Trotsky a means of
doing away with this source of trouble. The third reason stems from the
second and is quite likely more important than either of the first two.
During this London episode of Jskra, Lenin and Trotsky were in accord on
most of the major issues. Lenin probably felt that Trotsky added to the
board would provide a stable majority which on most of the critical questions
would be in his favor.1 It is this last point which undoubtedly determined
Plekhanov's hostile attitude toward Lenin's proposal.
The internal conflicts became more pronounced as the time for the
Second Congress grew near. These were very largely centered around the pro-
posed draft declaration of the Congress and will be discussed in the next
chapter. Internal conflicts, however, were by no means the only source of
disagreement. Vernal sources were also present. Although they usually
formed a united front on issues involving other tendencies, groups, or pub-
lications, even here discord among the Iskra editors was not always avoided.
Iskra's relations with its oppositional forces and the attitudes among the
editors in respect to those forces will be the subject of the next section.
1 Trotsky, Jjy. UJb P- 155.
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Iskra and Zarva versus "Economise"
Prior to the Second Congress and following the founding of Iskra there
were two major tendenoies within Russian Social-Democracy; "Econoraism" and
Iakrovotsi
.
1
"Economistio * groups were given a number of different names
such as Bernsteinlsm, revisionism, lchvostlsni . primitive-ism, and opportunism.
Despite the different labels given to these groups all of them shared a com-
mon unity in their basio ideas and all were representative of one particular
tendency in the Marxist movement. The term "revisionism" first appeared in
1899 in a book by Bduard Bernstein entitled, Die Vorau33atzunrrln dee Sozlal-
lsmu3 und ^lie Aufgaben der Sozialderookratle . (English translations Evolution-
ary Socialism ). Bernstein was a veteran German Social-Democrat and a member
of the Second International which had been founded soon after Marx's death.
In his book, Bernstein claimed that the basic contentions of Marx were re-
futed by the actual development of capitalism and he went on to demand a re-
vision of the revolutionary philosophical, economic, and political principles
of Marx; hence, the term "revisionism", Bernstein desired to substitute in
the place of these principles a theory of conciliation of class antagonisms,
a denial of the Socialist revolution, and a reliance upon gradual permeation
of capitalist society by socialism.
Bernstein rejected the theory of class struggle because he considered
it necessary that Social-Demooracy work within the framework of constitutional
democracy. Class struggle appeared to him to be out of place in a strictly
democratic society governed by the will of the majority. For this reason he
1 This name will be used to indicate hoth the Iskra and Zarva tendency
or viewpoint and also to indicate the group which professed adherence to
Iskra'
s
and Zarya's principles.
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proposed his theory of conciliation among the classes. The revolution for
Bernstein was to be a gradual process worked out within the framework of
bourgeois society. Social-Democracy should change from a party of the violent
sooial revolution into a democratic party of social reform.l Finally, in
denying the Socialist revolution and proposing gradual change, he subordinat-
ed the dialectical process of Marxian materialism to a theory of evolution-
ary change.
What Bernsteinisim was in western Europe, "Eoononism" and a type of
"Eoonomlsm", khvostlsm was in Russia. Following the mass arrests in Russia
during the 1890' s many Social-Demoorats began to lose confidence in the
politico-revolutionary activities of their movement. Consequently, "in their
efforts to win the masses (they) let their political slogans recede into the
background. "2 Gradually, a new tendency developed which wa3 essentially
"eeonomio" in character. These "Economists" argued that they should champ-
ion the practical needs of labor such as shorter hours, higher wages, and
better working conditions. Certain "Economists" even repudiated the politi-
cal leadership of the workers altogether, asserting that politics should be
the business of the liberal intellectuals. 3 In repudiating the political
struggle the Russian "Economists" picked up two new titles. The first,
khvostlsm. meant, literally, dragging at the tail and was derisively applied
to the "Economists" to indicate their inclination to follow rather than lead
the revolutionary movement.U Secondly, the term, "primitiveness", was applied
1 Lenin, 0£. ci£., p. 95.
2 Trotsky,
>ft Ljfe., p. 135.
3 David Shub, Lenin (New York: Doubleday ft Company, Inc., 1948), p. 4.0.
* V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1929),
v. 2, p. 494.
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to them as indicative of their attitude toward organization. The "Economists"
considered it necessary that the working class be organized on only the broad-
est democratic principles with the maximum application of the elective prin-
ciple. They concluded that it was unnecessary to maintain a close-knit nation-
al organization to bind the local groups into one unit. Considering the non-
political nature of "Economism", this principle of prlmltiveness in organ-
ization seems to follow logically. There would be little need for an organ-
ization equipped to exert political pressure over large areas if the only
demands were "economic" ones which could and had to be met locally.
The opportunistic! views of the Revisionists in western Europe and the
"Economists" in Russia were subjected to constant attack from the leftists,
or revolutionary, branches of Social-Democracy. In western Europe, however,
the Revisionists were able to establish themselves as a highly influential
branch of the movement. This was probably due to a desire of the European
Marxists to maintain unity at all costs. By 1900 the Revisionists had gain-
ed a position of leadership in the western ^ropean Socialist movement. In
Russia the "Economists" did not go so nearly unchallenged. With the estab-
lishment of Iskra and Zarva . "war on ("Economism") was declared along the
whole front, beginning with questions of theory and ending with questions of
organization and party structure. "2
In their battle with "Economism" the Islcrovot3l maintained what they
considered to be an orthodox Marxist viewpoint on all issues. In 1900, Lenin
wrote: "We stand for the consistent development (of ideas) in the spirit
So-called because of the tendency to make use of present opportunities
for mild reform rather than to work for revolution.
2 Lenin, od,. clt. . p. 80.
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of Marx and Engels, resolutely rejecting the half-hearted and opportunistic
revisions which have become so fashionable thanks to Bernstein . . . ".1 The
Iskrovotsl continually emphasized the class-struggle and the hegemony of the
proletariat; i. e., that the working class must lead the revolutionary move-
ment. The necessity for practical political aotion was also stressed, as
was the need for an effective organization to promote this political action.
Finally, the Iskrovotsl denied the principle of spontaneity of the mass
revolutionary movement which was the foundation of the "Economic" tendency.
According to the Iskrovotsl no working class was able to develop a
class consciousness exclusively by its own efforts. Without leadership the
most that it could hope to develop would be trade-union consciousness, or
a desire to conduct an economic struggle. 2 For the Iskrovotsl this spontan-
eous trade-unionist striving which developed if "revolutionary" leadership
were not available emasculated the working class by depriving then of their
rightful place as political leaders. The "Economists", then, in helping the
workers carry on the economic struggle were, according to the Iskrovotsi .
making a serious mistake. In defense of their position the "Sconomist" groups
usually denied that any other kind of work was feasible under existing con-
ditions.
Unconvinced by thi3 argument, the Iskrovotsi developed their program
not only on a reassertion of Marxian revolutionary principles but beyond that
to one which Included definite ideas on organization and praotioal action.
Rather than a "primitive" decentralized party suoh as was advocated by the
1 MA', P. 19.
2 Ibid., book 2, p. 114.
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"Economists", tho Iskrovotsl advocated a national political organization
with a strict monolithic structure and with one common and definite point
of view. The need for such an organization was recognized by Lenin even
while he was still in exile. In 1899, after reading Bernstein's book which
he w&3 told was very popular among some Russian Social-Democratic groups,
he wrote Potresov: "Cursed Ru33ian disorganization is entirely to blame
here !".*
In the years of 1901 and 1902 the conflicting viewpoints of the two
tendencies became clearly outlined. The "Economists" established their battle
stations in Rabochava Mvsl . Pabochaya Delo . and in other journals and pamph-
lets while the Iskrovotsl gave attack through their publications, Iskra and
Zarya . "!ven before the first issue of Iskra appeared, however, the future
Iskrovotsl made a decisive break with the "Economists ".
The event which brought about this split took place during the month
of April, 1900. At that time a conference of the Union of Russian Social-
Democrats Abroad wa.3 held at Geneva. The original founders of the Union,
the Emancipation of labor group, attended this conference as did a larger
number of representatives from groups which had adopted the "Economic" tend-
ency. Tindlng themselves in the minority the Emancipation of Labor group
and a number of individuals who supported the group left the Union and creat-
ed a separate organization which was first named the Russian 3ooial-Democrats
and still later the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad.
The majority of the oonferenoe in the meantime retained the name of the
Union and began to agitate for a Party Congress. Several local groups in
1 Hill and Mudie, 03. cji., p. 91.
aRussia supported the move but a congress was never convened fron this in-
spiration.l The Emancipation of Labor group opposed the Onion's efforts to
call a congress and within a month after the split even denied that the
Union still could act as sole representative of the Russian Social-Demoorats
outside of Russia; a thing which it had done when the Emancipation of Labor
group was still within its membership.
Ostensibly, the chief reason for the split was the repudiation by the
Emancipation group of the "Economic" tendencies in the Union. This point,
however, was not recognized by many Social-Democrats at the time. In answer
to one such person, Lenin wrote on September 5, 1900
i
You write that (l) there are no differences of opinion where
principles are oonoerned and that (2) the Union is actually ready to
prove its determination to struggle against the "economic direction".
We are convinced that you are mistaken on both points. Our conviction
is based on (certain publications endorsed by the Union which Lenin
thought indicated an "Economic" trend). ... We intend to appear in
literature with a refutation of the opinion that there is no difference
of principles.
. . .
2
Whether the majority of the Union actually did profess basic differences
of principle from the Emancipation of Labor group is not of primary import-
ance. The significance of the conference was not in any real or imagined
differences but in the actual split which occurred. After the April confer-
ence the Union group took to their Journals and the Emancipation of Labor
group did likewise. April, 1900 marked the date of the start of a well-
organized literary battle.
One of the first journals to reveal definite "Economic" tendencies,
according to the Iskrovotsl . wan the Rabochava Mysl (Workers' Thought).
1 Lenin, 2B.. oi£., book 1, p. 312.
2 Hill and Mudie, ojj. oi£., p. 110.
A2
This newspaper was founded in 1898 by a small group of Russian emigres who
had established their independence from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats
Abroad but had remained sympathetic with that organization. The first ia-
portant evidence of the newspapers' deviation from revolutionary Marxism was
contained in the Special Supplement tp the Rabochaya Hvsl published in 1899.
Although Lenin and other future l3krovotsl probably knew about the Special
Supplement while in exile, it was not until after the founding of Iskra that
Lenin criticized it at length. In the leading article of the Special Sup-
plement the principle of evolutionary socialism was expressed:
Socialism ... which is the outcome of the evolution of the social
methods of modern production, and whioh inevitably leads to the complete
socialization ... of all its means is merely the further and higher
step in the development of modern society.-*-
Lenin found in this statement a subordination of the revolutionary element
of socialism. He concluded that the goal of socialism formulated in this
manner would be endorsed by all the liberals and all the bourgeosie—whom,
of course, he considered to be enemies of sooialism. At another place in
the Special Supplement , a criticism was made of the political activities of
oertain Russian Social-Democrats. This activity, it was felt, harmed the
economic cause of the workers by arousing industry against all things Social-
Democratic.*
It is difficult to determine the validity of the charges of "Eoonomism"
made against Rabochaya Hysl . Even after the Iskrovotsl labeled the view-
points with which they disagreed, many jroup3 refused to admit that they were
less Marxian (and therefore, aocording to sooiali3t reasoning, less right)
1 Lenin, Selected Works . p. 4-96.
2 Lenin, Collected '.forks , book 2, p. 184.
«than their adversaries.
Although no substantiation is available, it is felt that the influence
of Hahochava Mysl must have not been considered vary ?reat after 1901, if
it ever was. After that year mention is seldom made of the paper in Iskra
or Zarva while even before then most of the polemics were direoted at the
single publication, the Special Supplement . Of the newspapers supporting
the Union after its split with the Emancipation of Labor group, Raboohaya
Delo was probably far more important than Rabochaya Mysl . Against the in-
fluence of Rabochaya Delo the Iskrovotsl direoted many articles and a pamph-
let of almost book length.
Raboohaya Delo (Workers' Deed) was first published in the late 1890'
s
and after the split between the Onion of Russian Social-Democrats in 1900,
the paper became the Union's official orijan. Because of its wide circulation
among emigre circles in western Europe it was well known among Marxian social-
ists. Despite the paper's affiliation with the Union, the Emancipation of
Labor group supported it for a few months after they had broken with the
Union. In February, 1900, 0. V. Plekhanov published a pamphlet entitled
Vade Mecum which was meant to be a guide to the editors of Rabochaya Delo .
It tjonsisted of articles and letters written by the leaders of the "Economist"
movement with editorial refutation by Plekhanov.1 This attempt by Plekhanov
to influence the policies of Rabochaya Delo was critically received and in
the months whioh followed the Emancipation of Labor group turned its attention
to the founding of Iskra .
By early spring of 1901 both Iskra and Zarya entered into open polemics
1 Nikolai N. Popov, Outline History of the. Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (New York: International Publishers, 1934), p. 75.
uwith Rabochaya Pelo .1 The Iskrovotsl criticized the Rabochaya Pelo for
their "Economic" tendencies and they vere in turn criticized for their
attempts to assume dictatorship over the entire Russian Social-Democratic
movement. Specifically, the Iskrovotsl found fault with the slogan, "free-
dom of criticism", which as advocated by the Rabochaya Pelo meant freedom
to present all issues and to allow individuals to voice their acceptance
or rejection. Only by this means could real unity among all Social-Demo-
crats be ultimately established, they felt. To the Iskrovotsl with their
desire to present a single tendency and for a monolithic Iskra-controlled
Social-Democratic organization, such a slogan was declared tantamount to
anarchy.
The "3tage" theory expressed by Rabochaya Pelo was also criticized by
the Iskrovotsl . This was a variation of the Bernstelnian argument for eco-
nomic demands to come first In the movement. In an article by B. Krlehevsky,
one of the editors of Rabochaya Pelo . he stated: "According to the theories
of Marx and Engels, the class interest is the decisive factor in history,
and consequently, that the proletarian struggle for the defence of its eco-
nomic interests must be of first Importance ... (however, these interests)
can be satisfied only by a politioal revolution. "2 Even though the first
"stat»e" should be that of satisfying the economic needs of the workers, the
final revolutionary stage still was considered neoessary by the Rabochaya
Delo-lsts . The Iskrovotsl chose to ignore this and raised the cry of "Eco-
nomism" because of the first "stage".
| Lenin, og. alt., book 2, p. 13.2 Quotation fromi Ibid ., p. 128.
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The most noteworthy literary strife between Islcra and Paboohava Delo
ocoured on questions of organization. The Iskrovotsl conceived of a 3trong,
centralized, Russian Social-Democratic organization to be built around a
newspaper such as the Iskra . On the other hand, the Rabochava Dslo-lsts
considered organization necessary only at the local level. The chief argu-
ments used by the Iskrovotsl in support of their plan were; (l) that only
such an organization would possibly bo able to coordinate the revolutionary
activities of the local groups effectively enough to bring about mass revolu-
tion and, (2) that only through a newspaper, devoted not to local problems
but to the problems of the entire movement, would it be possible to bring
about group sentiment in favor of revolution. The newspaper, then, was to
be a collective organizer.! Local groups would first attain a unity of
purpose through the propaganda of the newspaper and then would be directed
to political activity by the newspaper's agents. These agents were to be
the core of the organization and would be chosen for their willingness to
devote their whole lives to the purpose of revolution. The arguments advanc-
ed against such a plan by Rabochava Delo were; (l) that the people would fail
to organize around something as ephemeral as a newspaper, and, (2) that the
local organizations already in existence were effectively participating in
the economic struggle, which is all that the Russian workers were yet capable
of, and, (3) that any centralized organization must not be imposed from above
but must rise from the masses. The local groups must band together on their
own initiative.
2
1 Jbid.., p. 230.
2 Ibid ., p. 225.
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The differences in the two positions were essentially the result of
disagreements on the question of spontaneity. The assumption of the Rabo-
ehaya Delo-lsta was that the political revolution would result spontaneously
from the masses after the economic stage had been passed. The IskroTot3i
in turn denied the spontaneous nature of the revolutionary movement and
therefore demanded an aotive organization dedicated to revolution.
The Iskrovot3i side of the argument nver organization was not carried
solely in the columns of Iskra and Zarva . During the month of December, 1901,
Lenin completed a pamphlet of which he had conceived while still in exile.
In the pamphlet which was entitled, What Is. To Be. Done 7. Lenin developed
fully his organizational plan and his criticism of the Raboehaya Delo . Soon
after this Lenin wrote a long polemical letter to the St. Petersburg Onion
of Struggle which at that time supported Raboehaya Delo. The letter which
came to be known as Letter To a Comraie . oovered in a much shorter space the
same ideas which were developed in What Is. To Bg Dong.!
Both Iskra and Raboehaya Delo considered the political revolution to
be the goal of socialism even though they conceived of the means of reach-
ing that goal in different ways. For this reason many Russian Soeial-Demc-
orats did not consider the debate carried on between the two papers as being
especially important and termed it senseless quibbling. One such Soeial-
Demoorat mirrored this feeling in a letter to Iskra :
Being in opposition to other S-D organizations which differ from
it in their views concerning the progress and tasks of the Russian labor
movement, Iskra
. in the heat of controversy sometimes forgets the truth.
... Emphasises points of disagreement that are frequently of little
material importance, and obstinately ignores numerous points of resemblance
in views. We have in mind Iskra '3 attitude toward Raboehaya Delo . 2
J Krup3kaya, op., sit., p. 28.2 Lenin, 0£. cit., p. 65.
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Even among some of the editors of Iakra the question arose as to wheth-
er the conflict was worth the sohism whioh might easily become permanent and
thus destroy the chances for a revolution. During 1901 serious considera-
tion was given to the prospect of reuniting the warring factions.
In the summer and autumn of 1901, negotiations were carried on between
the Social-Democratic organizations abroad. These groups consisted of the
Union of Russian Social-Democrats which represented the interests of Rabo-
ohaya Delo . the Foreign Committee of the Jewish Bund, and the Russian Social-
Democrats which represented Iskra and Zarva . The first conference of these
groups took place at Geneva in early June. It was called on the Initiative
of the Borba group, an emigre Sooial-Democratic organization of relatively
minor importance to the movement. After a few days' discussion the conference
drew up a resolution which was aooepted by all those present. The resolution
condemned "Economism" and Bernsteini3m and was regarded as a serious step
toward a rapprochement between the Rabochava Delo-lsts and the Iskrovotsi .
The resolution was intended to have received formal endorsement of all the
organizations involved at a "Unity" Congress to be called in October of the
same year.
During the months which followed this preliminary conference both sides
began to regret their concessions. When the "Unity" Congress finally met at
Zurich on October 4.th, Lenin had convinced his co-editors that a final break
was necessary. Both Plekhanov and (fartov had opposed this action and only
yielded to Lenin after lengthy persuasions. The Rabochava Delo-ists . in the
meantime, had begun to suspect that the Iskrovotsi had designs on the autonomy
of their paper. During the opening days, the Iskrovotsi drew up a resolution
whioh virtually recorded the impossibility of unity by demanding that all
vs
groups accept unconditionally the political policy of Iskra . Following
the offioial and permanent break, the Russian Social-Democrats reorganized
under the name of the League of Russian Revolutionary Sods'! -Democrats
Abroad. The League represented itself as a section of the Iakra organiza-
tion abroad and its ohief functions were to be to contribute to the publi-
cation and circulation of Iskra and Zarva and to assist in training mili-
tant workers as leaders for the revolutionary movement in Russia. 1 Follow-
ing the "Unity" Congress the Iskrovotsi became more uncompromising than
ever in their attitude toward "Economic" tendencies and in turn the Raboohava
Delo and other oppositional newspapers found themselves less interested in
denying Iskra 's charges and more interested in proving their own viewpoints
to be the oorrect ones.
Among the Russian lferxian groups which were in conflict with the Iskro-
votsi at least a part of the time during 1900 to 1903 were the Borba group,
the Jewish Bund , and the Yuzhnv Rabochv-ists . The Borba (Struggle) group
which was founded in Paris in the beginning of 1901 was very small and con-
sisted entirely of Russian Social-Democratic writers. At first the members
of the group contributed to Iskra and Zarva . After unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to federate with the editorial board of Iskra . the Borba group came out
as an independent literary association and tried to occupy an intermediate
position between the Iskrovotsi and the Raboohava Delo-l3ts . Subsequently
the Borba group became opposed to Iskra's organizational principles, partic-
ularly the principles of centralism and conspiracy (against the Czarist govern-
ment). The Borba group failed to gain much prominence and they were finally
1 Lenin, Selected Works, p. 5U.
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disbanded at the Second Congress of The Russian 3oeial-Democrats held in
1903.
The Bund , which was the Jewish title of the Jewish Labor League in Poland,
Lithuania, and Russia was established in 1397 at a congress in Vilna. The
Bund represented a large number of Jew3 Interested in the principles of
Russian ooeial-Demooraoy and Marxism in general. At its Fourth Congress in
April, 1901, the Thind passed a resolution in favor of the federal system of
organization whioh would have established the Bund as an autonomous self-
controlled unit in any future nation-wide Russian Social-Democratic organ-
ization. In the principles of organization adopted by the Iskrovotsi there
was no place for 3uoh an uncontrollable unit. Although the Iskrovotsi were
willing to grant the Bund autonomy on purely Jewish matters no 3uch freedom
was conceivable on questions which affected the entire movement.1 The Iskro-
ota
;
l devoted several articles to a discussion of the resolution and so af-
fronted many of the Bunjists that they began to support Raboohaya Delo . Thus
the question of Jewish autonomy remained unsettled and was a eau3e of con-
siderable debate at the Seond Congress in 1903.
The Yuzhnr Raboohy (Southern Worker) was a Russian Social-Democratic
group formed in Skaterinoslav in 1899. During January of the following year
the group established a newspaper which was given the same name as the group
itself. In the south of Russia and particularly in the Ukraine, the Yuzhny
Rabochy had considerable influence among Social-Democrats. 2 The political
views of the group were oloser to the Iskrovotsi than to the "Economists".
The group recognized and approved of the principle of an immediate political
1 Krupskaya, oe. cit.. p. 62.
2 Lenin, 00.. sit., p. 341.
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revolution by the working olaas but differed with the Iskra chiefly on
organizational matters. Before Trotsky was 3ent to London and Iskra he
made a trip to Poltava where he negotiated with the Yuzhnv Rabochy for
Iskra support. While there he analyzed the Yuzhnv Haboohv's reluctance
to accept l3kra's organizational principles as a "desire to remain a sep-
erate group and publish their own popular organ". 1 Other disagreements
arose over their dissatisfaction at the sharp polemics which the Iskra
directed against the Liberals from time to time and also at Iskra 's empha-
sis on the peasant movement as a revolutionary force. Despite these dlf-
derenoes the Yuzhnv Rabochv generally supported the Iskrovotsl on important
issues after 1902.
In the preceding section all the groups which have been discussed had
at least two things in common: they all professed a common foundation in
Marxian philosophy, and the two central tendencies, represented by Iskrovotsi
and "Sconomism" each claimed to possess the oorrect interpretation of that
philosophy. On the fringe of Russian Social-Democracy stood Legal Marxism
and altogether outside of the Marxian movement were the Socialist-Revolution-
ary and the Liberal groups. Iskra's relations with these groups will be the
subject of the last section of this chapter.
Legal Marxism, Liberalism, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries
Negotiations between the editors of the future Jsjjra, Lenin and Martov
and the chief representatives of Legal Marxism began at the conference in
Pskov during April, 1900. At that tine P. Struve and B. Turgan-Baranovsky,
the representatives of Legal Marxism, indicated their desire to publish a
Krupskaya, op.. ci£., p. 59.
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revolutionary journal abroad. Later that same year, a fev weeks after the
first issue of Iskra had been printed, further negotiations were commenced
in Munich between Lenin, Potresov, and Vera Zasulitoh of Iskra . and Struve,
who represented the Legal Marxists. Struve, who had considerable oontact
among the bourgeois intelligentsia from whom ho could obtain all sorts of
material against the Russian Government, demonstrated hia desire to act not
merely as a contributor to Iskra and Zarva but also made the proposal to
publish a third organ, the Sovremennove Obozrenive . (Contemporary Review).
This journal was to carry only political articles and have no mention of
Russian Social-Democracy on its oover. Of the editors of l3kra at the
negotiations only Lenin objected to Struve 's proposal. Apparently Lenin
feared that Iskra and Zarva would become subordinated to the Sovremennove
Obozrenive and that Struve would dominate that journal with hia own political
views. In the following excerpt from a letter to Plekhanov, who was not at
the conference, Lenin explained his objections!
We shall run messages for Judas (Struve) who by his bossing in
the Sovremennove Obozrenive will make a magnificent "Liberal" career
and will attempt to put into the shade not only the weighty Zarva but
also Iskra (it is obvious, that he will be the master there, and the
complete masterj for he has the money and 99* of the material—we will
very rarely be in a position to send anything there). We will do the
running about, the fussing, the proof-reading, the transporting, while
Hia Excellency, Mr. Judas will be the editor-in-chief of the most in-
fluential journal.
. .
.1
In spite of Lenln'a objections to the plan, all of the other editors
of Iskra voted in favor of it. By March, 1901, declarations outlining the
new venture were drawn up but they were never published. A letter from a
friend of Struve containing money which was specified to be used only for
1 Hill and Mudie, 0£. oii., p. 131.
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Sovremennove Obozrenlye was indignately received and the whole project was
dropped. Strove and the Iskrovotai went their separate ways.l Later Strove
and other Legal Marxists helped form a group called Osvolozhdenive . (Snan-
cipation), which had as its chief aim, constitutional reform. Still later
he took part in founding the Constitutional Democratic Party vhioh was an
important Liberal party in Russia after the Revolution of 1905.
After negotiations between the Legal Marxists and Iskra had broken down,
the liberal tendencies of the Legal Marxists became a target for several
articles which appeared in Iskra . Liberalism in Russia was supported largely
by intellectuals in the growing middle class and the enlightened land-owners.
The chief demand of Liberalism at this period of Russian history was for a
constitutional assembly and at least a limited suffrage. The Iskra applaud-
ed the antl-Czarist tendencies of the Russian Liberal journals but found
fault with their desire for reform without revolution. Among the editors
of Iskra, Lenin was the most unwavering in his criticism of the Liberal
program. An article by Lenin entitled, The Persecutors of ttjg, Zemstvo and
illg Hannibal
3
of Liberalism , whioh was directed at both Strove and the Russian
Liberals, gave rise to an animated discussion among the editors of Iskra.
Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasulitch vigorously objected to the severity of the
tone toward the Liberals adopted in the artioal. Plekhanov wrote: "This is
not at all the time to scold the Liberals. It is pedantic ... We must
treat the Liberals as a potential ally. "2 Lenin moderated the tone of hie
article slightly but insisted on retaining the sharp criticism of Strove.
1 Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (Hew York: International
Publishers, 1932), p. 320.
2 Quotation from: Popov, fip.. cji., p, 84.
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This incident serves to point up onee more the existence of conflicting
viewpoints among the editors of Iskra . The total of Iskra 's polemics a-
gainst the Liberals probably server) far better as propaganda among the Rus-
sian Soeial-Demoorats than a3 an influenoe on the Liberal movement. Thie
type of polemlo emphasised the revolutionary joal of the l3'<rovotsi .
As the auocessor of the traditions of revolutionary Harodnikl and
Harodovoltsi. the Socialist-Revolutionary party regarded the use of terror
as an important political instrument. At non-lferxists they rejected the
idea of the class struggle and of the hegemony or leadership of the pro-
letariat in the revolutionary movement.1 In the early 1900' s their organ-
isation consisted mainly of separate groups working independently of one
another but by 1905 they had developed a national party. In both the Iskra
felT* articles appeared- which attempted to refute the Soaialist-Revolution-
ary tendency. The editors of Islcra were in basic agreement in their at-
titude toward the Sooiallst-Revolutlonary party, but, as in the polemics
directed against the Liberals, Lenin was the most uncompromising and the most
critical.
In all of the arguments and conflicts with other tendencies and groups
the Igkrovotsj maintained the desire for a close-knit Sooial-Democratic
organization as the essential element for achieving a revolution. The organ-
ization which the Iskrovotsl desired, deponded to a large degree, they felt,
on the effectiveness of their publications, Iskra and Zarya . An enterprise
as ooncrete as a newspaper can seldom be a success on the wish alone, however.
Many technical problems almost always surround such a venture. The technical
1 Popov, 0£. ait., p. 107.
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problems enoountered by the l3'crovotsi and the plan3 for a congress of the
Russian 3oeial-Denoorat3 as a step toward establishing a unified organization
provide the subject matter for the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
PUBLISHING ISKRA AND ZARYA
The problems confronting the editors of Iskra and Zarya were not the
ordinary ones which would be encountered in any publishing enterprise.
Iskra and Zarva were not ordinary publications. They were devoted to con-
spiracy against a government, to revolution, and to agitation among the
masses; all characteristics which uould tend to make them hijhly unpopular
with any established government and Germany was no exception. So in ad-
dition to having such worries of the printing operation as broken presses,
torn matrixes, and misplaced type, the publishers of l3kra and Zarya were
troubled with the possibility of police raids and arrests, J. H, Diets,
the German Social Democrat and the first publisher of Iskra and Zarya was
keenly aware of the illegal nature of his activities; and he worried about
them. His was a well-established, respectable printing house which had built
a reputation among German liberal and reformist groups by publishing legal
literature of a high quality. Despite Diets ' personal adherenoe to Marxism,
he apparently wa3 never completely eonvinoed that the achievements of Iskra
and Zarya were worth the constant threat which they presented to his print-
ing house by being published there. Lenin and the other editors were com-
pletely baffled by Dietz' timidness. To them, the cause represented by the
two publications was worthy of any sacrifice and all reasonable risks. The
differing attitudes of Diets and Lenin are mirrored in the following letter
written by Lenin to P. B. Axelrod on the 20th of March, 1901:
There is some unpleasantness over Zarya . That capricious gentleman,
Diets, has definitely rejected your editorial artiole, having
. . . sniff-
ed out the smell of "union" etc. (Dietz was afraid that the police might
discover the links between the German Sooial-Demoerats and the Iskro-
votsi ) . . . and to print instead a few words "to the readers". The
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new censorship is terribly unpleasant] And the cover too has suf-
fered: They even crossed out the words "in collaboration with
a fow Russian Social-Democrats". When shall we be rid of the tutelage
of such rotten comrades (Dietz)?^
Despite Diets' reluctance to handle the illegal publications, he con-
tinued to do so until the early part of 1902. At that time the German police
with the help of the agents of the Russian 3ecret police ( Ochrana ) raided
the printing establishment at Stuttgart. All the editors, then living at
Muni oh, were able to escape arrest. First they went to Switzerland and later,
in April, transferred both the editorial board and the printing operations
to London. 2 In London, contact was made with Harold Quelch, and other pro-
minent English Social-Democrats who helped establish the secret presses.
Later, in 1903, when the editorial board transferred to Geneva, most of the
printing operation was retained in London. At the time of the Second Con-
gress in August of 1903, the lead type wa3 being set and the matrixes were
being oast in London, while the actual printing was done in Genf, Switzer-
land.
Both Ista-a and Zarva were printed on thin, onion-skin paper and each
printed sheet contained as many as 100,000 letters of the alphabet. The
reasons for this crowded printing on such light paper obviously were conspir-
atorial. Most of the copies of the publications were printed for Russian
consumption and consequently they had to be of a size convenient ''or smug-
gling. Iskra was much like a regular newspaper in that it had no cover and
appeared with a banner heading on page one. Its dimensional size was about
half that of a regular daily newspaper. Usually no Issue was longer than
* Hill and Mudie, op., cit., p. 136.
2 Kluge, lpc. cit .
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two printed signatures (eight pages) and more frequently, only one.
was much longer and had a cardboard cover which gave it more the appearance
of a magazine. Both publications were generally printed in Petit type al-
though a few issues were printed in Borgese type.l When copies of Iskra
and Zarva reached Social-Democrats in Russia they were often reprinted in
a variety of forms from single mimeographed sheets to printed pamphlets.
In the three year3 before the Second Congress, forty-eight issues of
Iskra and four issues of Zarva had been printed. Iskra appeared at inter-
vals of approximately twenty days but with no regularity. Sometimes two
months would elapse between issues and sometimes only a few days. Occasion-
ally two issues of Iskra would be printed at the same time and would be
circulated as a double number. 2 The first issue of Zarya was published
during April, 1901. The next two issues appeared in December of the same
year as a double number and the final issue was printed in August, 1902.
Although the material for it was prepared, issue number five of Zarva did
not appear because of differences which arose between Lenin and Plekhanov
over certain articles which were to have been used in that issue. Part of
the material which had been collected for issue number five of Zarva was
later distributed among Russian Social-Democratic emigres in the form of
i
1 Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, go,, cit .. p. !£.
2 A partial list of publication dates for Iskra follows:
Issue Number 1 - Dec, 1900 Issue Number 9 - Oct., 1901
" "2 - Feb., 1901 " " 10 - Nov., 1901
3 - April, 1901 doublg
/" « U _ Nov. 20, 1901
4 - May, 1901 X" " 12 - Deo. 6, 1901
" 11" rT' 25 double no. <" " 13 - Jan. 2, 19026 - July, 1901 V« » U - Jan. 7, 1902
" " 7 - Aug., 1901 i 15 _ Jan. 15, 1902
" 8 - Sect., 1901 " » 16 - Feb. H, 1902
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two brochures.l
The type of articles which appeared in Iskra and Zarya reflected the
purposes of each publication. The articles in Iskra were devoted mainly to
purposes of agitation and dealt less with the theoretical side of Social-
Democracy than did those in Zarva which wore mostly intended to serve as
propaganda among the intellectuals. The variety of topics and the soope of
the subject matter in both Zarya and l3kra are reflected in the titles of
the articles. A partial listing of articles whioh appeared in Iskra includ-
ed such titles as i Orient Tasks of Our Movement ! The Chinese War : Hannibals
of Liberalism : The Agrarian Question and '.he "Critics of Marx" : A Conservation
with Defenders of Economlsm : Another Massacre ; and, Jjje. Drafting of 232 ££21-
dents into the Army . In Zarya were articles entitled: Review af Internal
Affairs : Socialism and the Political Struggle Once Again : and, Cant Against
Kant , to include only a very few.
Most of the material for both of the publications was written by the
editors. In the first forty-five numbers of Iskra, Martov wrote thirty-
nine of the articles and Lenin, thirty-twos while Plekhanov wrote twenty-
four, Potresov only eight, Zasulitoh, six, and Axelrod, four. The remainder
of the articles were written by Sooial-Democrats who only occassionally con-
tributed, such as Rosa Luxemburg, L. G. Deutsch, and Leon Trotsky. 2 The
majority of articles whioh appeared in garya were written by Plekhanov and
Lenin although the other editors and a few persons outside the Iskra staff
contributed also.
1 Kluge, pjj. flii,, p. 154.
2 Wolfe, ojj. £it., p. 251.
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Since the six editors of Iskra and Zarva not only wrote most of the
material for those publications but also supervised the printing and dis-
tribution, their personalities were refleoted in the whole enterprise and
were important factors In bringing about its success or failure. Among the
older editors, G. V. Plekhanov was unquestionably the leader. Not only had
he been associated with Social-Democratic activities longer than any of the
rest but he also possessed an imposing intellect and was a clever writer and
orator. Of the Islcrovotsi . Plekhanov alone had written whole books on pure
Marxian theory. It was Plekhanov's task as a staff member of Iskra to ex-
pound the major generalizations of Marxian doctrine and to promote Iskra 'a
cause among his many friends in the western European Social-Democratic or-
ganizations. His chief weakness was in the field of practical activity.
He had so completely lo3t touch with Russia during his long exile that he had
little appreciation for the practical, revolutionary designs of the young-
er editors. It was this in Plekhanov's make-up which led him into a number
of heated discussions with Lenin who thought of the revolution as the mo3t
valuable objective of the Iskrovotsl . During the period, 1900-1903, Plekhanov
was already entering upon a state of decline, according to Trotsky, who,
it will be remembered cherished no »reat love for Plekhanov. In his memoirs,
Trotsky wrote: "His (Plekhanov's) strength was undermined by the very
thing that was giving strength to Lenin—the a-iproaoh of the revolution.
... The nearer the shadow of the revolution crept, the more evident it be-
came that Plekhanov was losing ground. He couldn't help seeing it himself
and that was the cause of his irritability toward the younger men.*1
1 Trotsky, Jfc Life, p. 150.
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P. B. Axelrod was much less in the midst of activities than was Flekhanov.
He wrote far less and was neither the brilliant speaker nor the clever debater
that Plekhanov was. His primary duties with the Iskra organization were to
interview visitors and new emigres from Russia and to organize financial aid
for the publications. As for his writings, they represented the "ideas and
experience of the German Social-Democrats "1 since hi3 closest associations
were with the German Marxists. He seldom contributed articles to either
Iskra or Zarya but what he did write was considered sound and of a good qual-
ity by the other editors. His ability to enter into the activities of the
organization was severely hampered by a condition of extreme nervousness.
Of this, N. K. Krupskaya, Lenin's wife wrote:
After long years of emigration in Switzerland
. . .
P. B. had
lost three-quarters of his working capacity; he did not sleep for
nights at a stretch and wrote with extreme intensity for months on
end, without being able to finish the article he had started. Some-
times it was impossible to decipher his handwriting owing to the nervy
way in which it was written.
Axelrod's handwriting produoed a profound imoression on V. I.
(Lenin) "It's simply awful," he often used to say, "If you get into
such a state as Axelrod . "2
Whether or not this physical handicap was the reason, Axelrod was one of
the least influential of the Iskra editors.
The only woman on the editorial board was Vera Zasulitch. She, too,
was of the "older" group having entered Marxist activities in the Chornv
Peredel group of the early 1880's. Her contribution to Iskra was found in
her ability to see persons and programs in human, sentimental terms, and
not as mere embodiments of political positions. As a woman she contributed
1 Ibid ., p. 151.
2 Krupskaya, op., cit., p. 39.
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a feminine quality of emotional expression laoking In the other editors.
Like Axelrod, though, she wrote little. Lenin observed at one time that
Vera Zasulitoh did not write but rather she put "mosaics together", placing
one sentence after another and "suffering actual tortures of creation" on
each.l Zasulitoh could usually be found on Plekhanov's side in any Inter-
necine quarrel but occasionally she would favor the "younger" editors or
would act as a conciliator between the two -groups.
Of the younger editors, I. 0. Martov was probably the most skillful
and productive writer. The other editors looked upon him as the principal
stand-by and knew that he could always be depended on to produce articles
on a wide range of happenings and problems. During a meeting in Geneva in
1903, Martov was observed by Shotman, a St. Petersburg Social-Democrat, who
wrote the following description of him:
Martov resembled a poor Russian intellectual. His face was pale,
he had sunken cheeks} his scant beard was untidy. His glasses barely
remained on his nose. His suit hung on him as on a clothes hanger.
. . .
His outward appearance wan far from attractive. But as soon as
he began a fervent speech all these outer faults seemed to vanish, and
what remained was his colossal knowledge, his sharp mind, and his fanat-
ical devotion to the cause of the working class.
2
Besides being the most productive editor, Martov also, with Lenin, did
most of the technical work, such as proof reading, connected with editing
the publications. Because of their business association he and Lenin were
together much of each day during this period. Lenih characterized Martov
as a "typical journalist. He is extraordinarily talented, seems to catch
everything in the wind, awfully impressionable, but he is all on the surface. "3
1 Quotation from! Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 18.
2 Quotation from: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, od.. aii., p, 58.
3 Quotation from: Krupskaya, ojj. cit .. p. 43.
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Throughout their association as editors of Iskra and Zarya . Martov usually
sided with Lenin on important issues but not to the extent of losing his
intellectual individuality. Occasionally he asserted himself against Lenin.
Such was not the case with Potresov.
A. N. Potresov was with Lenin and Martov at the Pskov Conference in
1900 and took a leading part in forming western European aontacts for pub-
lishing Iskra . He did not, however, contribute much to the organisation
after 1901. An illness, the nature of which is not known, foroed him to
stay in the background of the Iskra and Zarya activities. What few writ-
ings he did produce seemed to differ little as yet from Lenin's.
Lenin contributed to the editorial board a quality not so prominently
possessed by the other editors—ingrained realism. In all of the squabbles
over theory among the editors, Lenin continually referred to the practical
objectives of the party. Again and again he reminded his colleagues of the
need for immediate activity and a practical organization to bring about the
Socialist revolution. Lenin had left Russia at the age of thirty, a nature
and determined man. His qualities of leadership apparently Impressed even
his enemies. Axolrod, with whom Lenin disagreed many times, said of him In
reference to their first meeting in 1895 that, "I felt that I had in front
of me a roan who would be the leader of the Russian Revolution. He was not
only a cultured Marxist ... but he knew what he intended to do and how it
was to be done, 1*! In 1903 the Russian Social-Democrat, Shotman, wrote i
I remember very vividly that after his (Lenin's) first address I
was won over to his side, 30 simple, clear, and convincing was his man-
ner of speaking. When Plekhanov spoke, I enjoyed the beauty of his
1 Quotation from: Valeriu Marcu, Lenin (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.,
1928), p. 48.
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speech ... but uhen Lenin arose In opposition I was always on Lenin's
side. Why? I oannot explain it to myself. But so it was, and not
only with me, but with ray comrades, also workers.
1
In 1924 Joseph 3talin said, "familiarity with Comrade Lenin's revolution-
ary activity at the beginning of the nineties, and especially since 1901, af-
ter the appearanoe of Iskra . led me to the conviction that in Comrade Lenin
we had an extraordinary man."2 This last quotation has a humorous implica-
tion. At the "beginning of the nineties" Stalin was eleven or twelve years
old and probably had few opinions one way or another about Lenin or even a-
bout Russian Social-Oemooracy. Even after Iskra was founded, although Stalin
undoubtedly read some of the issues, he could hardly have known much about
Leninj he, a semi-illiterate worker in a south Russian province and Lenin,
an emigre in western Europe who almost never signed any of his own articles
whioh appeared in Iskra .
Despite these later bogus attempts such as Stalin's to glamorise Lenin
and thus gain through association, it seems clear that Lenin in his own right
must have possessed a commanding mind and a certain genius for leadership.
Lenin was undoubtedly the most important driving force behind Iskra and Zar-
ya
.
He corrected most of the proofs of Iskra and assidiously attended to
the details whioh surrounded the paper's publication. Nearly all the edit-
ing wa3 done by him and fertov and frequently several issues would be pub-
lished without any consultation with the other four editors.
Not only was Lenin concerned with the publishing phase of the Iskro-
votsl activities but he also carefully supervised the development of Iskra
1 Quotation from! Marx-En ; I a-Lenln Institute, fip.. oli., p. 59.2 Quotation from: Leon Trots'--, Stajlln . Ag Appraisal of tlje (fan. and.
His. Influence (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941), p. 48.
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groups in Russia. Almost all the correspondence ^rom Russia to the l3kra
offios was eventually read by him and he frequently answered these in de-
tail. His realistio frame of mind and his oonoorn with all parts of the
Is'crovotsl activities are illustrated in the following letter which he
wrote to an l3kra group in Kharkov on January 15, 1903
»
Many thanks for the detailed letter about the position of affairs
«
Such letters are very rarely written to us, although we need them ter-
ribly badly and should be receiving ten times as many .... Is Iskrs,
read to the workers oiroles? With explanations of the articles? Which
articles ;ire read m03t eagerly and what sort of explanations are asked
for? Is there any propa j.inda conducted amon.; the workers about con-
spiratorial methods and about taking up illegal revolutionary work on
a largo scale V-
Although moat of Lenin*3 articles were unsigned, he frequently used the
pronoun "I" and would refer to articles in past issues which usually were
some which he had written. Trotsky, in noting this egoism in Lenin's per-
sonality, conoluded that the practice gave Lenin's viewpoints a strong po-
sition amoag Iakra'a rea'?ra. Although few persons knew exactly Lenin's
share in the newspaper, all were aware that a special set of ideas "present-
ed in an especially stark, insistent, repetitive, unadorned, and matter-of-
fact way, kept re-curring a^ain and again, "3
As with many highly practical men, Lenin possessed a certain amoral
quality in his make-up. This feature of his personality caused several con-
flicts between him and the other editors and -jradually alienated them from
him. frequently Lenin was unooraprondsingly severe with special friends of
the other -editors but was dogmatically stubborn in his defense of his own
1 Hill and Mudle, ojj. ci£., p. 174.
2 Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 24.
3 Wolfe, oji. fii£., p. 153.
65
friends and agents. All of Lenin's activities were focused on the practical
goal of revolution. He cared little that Plekhanov was more profound in his
theoretical discussions or that Martov was a more prolific writer than he.
The results were always what interested Lenin and he generally felt that his
own methods were the right ones and the ones which would eventually yield the
results whioh he desired. That history later proved him right might well
serve as a testimonial to both hi3 judgment and hl3 abilities of leadership
during this period of his life.
Others outside the editorial board but close to the center of the
Iskra organization were N. K. Krupskaya, L. Trotsky, L. G. Deut3ch, and a
Russian named Blumenfeld. Krupakaya acted as secretary to the organization
and Trotsky was used /airily as a writer and lecturer. Deutsch was nearly
Plekhanov's age and was a close friend of the older editors. His job was
that of administrator of Iskra and Zarva and as 3uch he handled financial
matters and advised the editors on the business phase of their publications.
Blumenfeld was the type-setter for l3kra and Zarva although after 1903 he
devoted much of his time to travelling secretly in Russia for the organization.
All of these members of the Iskra staff functioned beyond their a&signed du-
ties. In such a small organization it was inevitable that each should be
familiar with the problems and quarrels of all the rest. In case of argu-
ments among the editors, the entire staff could usually be depended upon to
take sides.
Even though the central organization which produced Iskra and TtifTl
numbered less than a dozen members, financial backing was still essential
1 Trotsky, Russian Revolution, p. 39.
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and a highly Important feature in Baking the venture a success. Money for
the organization came from three sources: wealthy sympathizers! Iskra groups
in Russia and elsewhere; and the outside earnings of the editors. The most
outstanding of the wealthy sympathizers was A. M. Kalmykova. Mrs. Kalsykova,
wa3 the wife of an official high in the Russian government. Her interest
in socialism had led her to make the acquaintance of both Lenin and Martov
while they were still in Russia. She not only supports'! the Iskrovotsi with
her own funds but also helped colleot a "bucket" from her friends. More
support came from the Russian millionaire manufacturer, Morozov. One source
indioated that Morozov contributed over two thousand rubles a month2 but this
seems very unlikely. At one time Lenin referred to the collection of 350
francs as a marvelous feat which was seldom equaled and it is doubtful if
he would have done so had l3kra been the regular recipient of two thousand
rubles.3 Croups in Russia adhering to the Iskra tendency occasionally sent
money to the headquarters but never in very large amounts. In some of the
main towns of western Europe, young Russian students and revolutionary in-
clined emigrants formed groups to collect money and to help distribute Jjjkra.
In the United States, the American Sooialist Society whose secretary, S. Inger-
man had been a member of the Liberation of Labor group, procured funds for
Iskra . On April 25, 1901 Lenin mentions in a letter having received 250
francs from the United States.^- Another American source was mysteriously
referred to as the California Gold Mine. Nothing is known about the "Cold
Mine" other than that it did contribute at least some money to the support
1 Wolfe, op. clt .. p. 103.
2 Ibid ., p. 26.
3 Hill and Mudie, op., clt .. p. 138.
U Ibid., p. U0.
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of l3kra . Finally, the editors themselves made contributions by support-
ing themselves without resort to Iskra's funds. Plekhanov earned his poor
living by copying and addressing envelopes. Axelrod made and sold kefir
(yogurt) and Lenin and Martov did translations and occasionally placed short
articles in non-party magazines. Seldom did they resort to taking a "wage"
for their work on Iskra and then it amounted to only five or ten rubles per
week ($2 to $5). Most of the editors gave an occasional lecture in Prance
or in England. These lectures were paid for by contributions from the au-
dience. The amount given in such cases was seldom more than seventy or
eighty francs or shillings.
1
So precarious was the cash position of the enterprise that frequently
letters written by the editors contained such statements as: "Our finances
are altogether bad 1*2 "Collect some money. At present we are almost re-
duced to penury and the receipt of a large sum is a matter of life or death. "3
Despite this strain of a low cash box which was almost always felt by the
editors they continued with their work; looking toward Russia where all their
most Important efforts were directed. The desire to build the influence of
the Iskrovotsl in Russia and to distribute Iskra and Zarva among the Russian
workers made them continually force along even in the face of perplexing
financial difficulties.
Within Russia the number of adherents to the principles of Iskra and
Zarya steadily grew between the years 1900 and 1904.. The first method by
which Iskra's influence was developed was that of establishing agents in the
1 Trotsky, Russian Revolution
, p. 33.
2 Hill and Mudie, ojj. £i£., p. U4.
3 ^bM., p. 137.
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principal cities of Russia. Before Lenin and Martov left Russia in 1900
they each 3pent several months locating these agent.3 from among their friends
and sympathizers. The moat prominent agents of the Iskra organization were
Radohenko, Lengnik, Krzhlzhanovsky, Lepeshinsky, Zemlyaohka, Bauman, Babush-
kin, and Noginj most of which later held important offices in the Communist
Party. Around these agents developed supporting groups which organized for
the purpose of distributing and studying Iskra . Besides these local groups
which were from their inception, Iskra-lnsplred. many persons who were first
associated with other local Social-Democratic tendencies later declared their
adherence to the Iskrovotsl . During 1903 and at the beginning of that year
in the following cities groups, or committees as they were called, supported
Iskra.i St. Petersburg, Moscow, Crekhovo-Zuevo, Tver, Saratov, Tula, Irkutsk,
Ekaterlnoslav, Kiev, Odessa, Poltava, and Nizhni-Novgorod. Communication
was maintained with Social-Democrats in a great many other cities and three
large groups of Iskra followers were represented in the Siberian League, the
Northern Labor League, and the Southern Worker.1 The actual number of persons
represented by these organizations is not known but probably it was in the
thousands. In view of the secret and illegal nature of the whole enterprise,
it becomes apparent that there could have been only an extremely small per-
centage of the Russian population actively working in the organization. How-
ever, considering the humble beginnings of Iskra even a small percentage was
probably viewed with optimism.
With the Russian Iskra groups demanding ever increasing amounts of lit-
erature the editors and their agents were confronted with critical problems
1 Popov, 2E. cit., p. 100.
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of supply and distribution. The publications of tha l3krovot3l ware smuggl-
ed across the Prussian, Austrian and Rumanian frontiers, by sea via Msirseil-
les, Alexandria, and the Bulgarian ports, through Archangel, through Tavriz
in Persia, and even through the Kola Peninsula. The smuggling operation
was itself a highly dangerous and adventurous one. Some of its difficulties
and its techniques are illustrated in the following letter written by Lenin
in June, 1901:
The Doctor must settle abroad, in Polangen, (Kurland Province) for
instance, (in such places we have links with the non-Russian side).
He must 3tudy the local conditions, (he ought to be able to speak Let-
tish and German, but perhaps he might manage without) and he should
try to find some respectable occupation, (1 am assurrad that a man oan
live there by having a private practice). He must get on good terms
with the minor local officials and accustom them to his frequent cross-
ing of the frontier. One does not need a passport to cross th«s fron-
tier there, but a "Grenzkarte" (valid for 23 days). With such frequent
crossings he might be able gradually to carry across a few pounds of
literature at a time. (On his person or in a oa3e, according to our
method and for which he will need a small medical instrument oase).l
All the details of smuggling, or transport as it was called, had to be
worked out with ears. One plan was to pack the literature in double-bottom-
ed trunks or in the binding of books placed in trunks which would be shipped
across the border to certain pre-arranged cities. There they would be called
for by Iskra agents. Frequently the police would discover the trunk's secret
and would arrest the person who claimed the shipment. This "suitcase" trans-
port was expensive and unsure, costing as much a3 one hundred rubles for each
trunk which so frequently was discovered and confiscated along with the ar-
rest of Iskra personnel. Another method of transporting Iskra was through
the use of the sea. The literature would be smuggled on board a ship destined
1 Hill and Mudie, 0£. ci£., p. K5.
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for a Russian seaport. Tho agent handling the transport uould wrap the
literature in waterproof parcels and drop it into the water just before
the ship docked. The parcel would then be fished out by other agents who
would be waiting along the coast in small rowboats.
From the printing press at Stuttgart the issues of Iskra and Zarya
were shipped to Berlin and 3tored in the cellars of the Vorwaerts . the of-
ficial organ of the German Social-Democratic party. From there the liter-
ature was sent to Russia by the various methods just mentioned. The large
quantities of literature whioh were shipped from there was no indication of
the amount which actually reached its intended destination. Much of it was
seised at the border, and some was simply destroyed by professional smugglers
who, having been paid for their 3ervice3, had no desire to complete the con-
tract. H. It. Krupskaya told of sending hundreds of pounds of literature to
Stockholm where it was to be snufrgled through Riga into St. Petersburg.
When she and Lenin visited Sweden on their way to r!usaia in 1905 they dis-
covered that all the literature was still in the cellar of the "People's
Home" in Stockholm. Although it is impossible to estimate accurately the
amount of literature which was actually smuggled into Russia, various es-
timates seem to indicate that only about l/lOth o" that published ever reach-
ed its intended destination. Nor ll it known how many copies of Iskra and
Zarya were printed. In a letter written by Lenin during 1901, he commended
an agent who was able to carry ten pounds of literature a month across the
border. 2 In another letter he referred to one-hundred sixty pounds of one
1 Krupskaya, og. eit., p. 55.
2 Hill and Mudie, 0£. cit .. p. L44-.
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issue having been taken across. Considering the weight of the thin paper,
and then the number of copies per pound, it is probable that at lea3t sev-
eral thousand copies of Iskra were successfully smuggled across the border
after each new printing and that probably each edition printed was over
ten thousand copies. The whole transport process not only failed to dis-
tribute the entire edition each time but it was also 3low. It frequently
took over a month for copies of l3kra to reach Russia after they had left
the presses.
One of the most distressing problems of transport was encountered in
providing passports for the agents. Moat of the passports had to be forged
since the Russian Government was at that time rather reluotant to give their
official passports to revolutionary conspirators. Persons skilled at forg-
ing were not easily found. M. K. Krupskaya alluded to the passport diffi-
culty in the following excerpt from her memoirs:
Peter Hemogenovieh ... had just done a long stretch in prison
... he considered himself a great expert at faking passports. He
contended that the best method was to smear them with sweat. At one
time all the tables in our "commune" were turned upside-down to serve
as presses for faked passports.
2
Along with faking passports the Iskra conspirators found it neoessary
to develop codes with which to carry on correspondence. Each significant
phase of their enterprise was referred to by a code name: passports V«oame
handkerohiefsj illegal literature was warm fur or beer; and such towns as
Odessa and Tver became Ossip and Terenty. The agents were each given a con-
spiratorial name which in later years they frequently adopted as their per-
manent signature.
3
1 Ibid.., p. 172.
2 Krupskaya, ojs. sit., p. 54..
3 Ibid ., p. 55.
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The literature which did reaah Russia wag frequently reprinted in
large quantities for wider eiroulation. L. Krassin and R. Classon, Iskra
agents in Russia, managed to establish a secret printing press in Baku in
1901.1 Another press was used for a few months in Northern Russia. This
press, the Akulina Press, was discovered by the police and destroyed. 2 Oth-
er smaller presses operated intermittently during the period from 1901 to
1904 and occasionally groups were able to use duplicating machines to re-
produce Iskra literature.
Once the literature was received by agents in Russia, whether direct
from the Iskra printing press or from an intermediary secret Russian press,
the problems of distribution and dissemination arose. There were several
methods of bringing fekra's message to the workers and intellectuals who
indicated an interest in revolutionary work. One method was to call secret
meetings which were conducted in small, isolated groups. These meetings
would usually take place in forrested areas away from the cities and sentries
would be stationed at intervals from the meeting place so as to spread an
alarm and thus avoid discovery by the police. The program of the meeting
usually consisted of having one person read from Iskra or Zarva to the others
and then discussions would follow. Although it was seldom possible for the
same group to meet with any regularity, apparently many converts to Iskro-
votal were made in this manner.3
When agents were able to get several hundred copies of Iskra they would
use the method of mass distribution which they called "sowing". Sowing
1 Hill and Mudie, ojj. fiii., p. 146.2 Krupskaya, ojj. fiit., p. 56.
3 Shub, 2jj. ci£., p. 46.
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frequently was done in factory areas or in crowded residential sections in
the large cities; places where it was felt that the literature would be the
most effective. Usually, the 30wers worked in pairs, one distributing the
literature while the other acted as a sentry. Some of the most effective
sowing took place in the theatres of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kharkov, Kiev,
and Odessa, There the agents would shower their literature down upon the
audience in the darkened theatre accompanying t!)is barrage with such shouts
as, "Down with autocraeyi" and, "Long live political freedom!»
The very nature of smuggling and sowing made a constant turn-over of
agents and Iskra followers inevitable. The risks taken by the agents led
to their arrests and even occasionally to a mental and physical collapse.
Maintaining touch with, and control over the Russian Iskrovotsi was one of
the major organizational problems of the editors, living as they did in
western Surope far from the scene of Iskra's mo3t important work. In August,
1902, Lenin was forced to write the following to a Russian Social-Democrat:
Sow you are complaining about our "Agents" ... "Agents" were
collected far too quickly ... I, know, I know it very well ...
but after all we are not creating human material for ourselves, but
are taking, and cannot refuse, what is given to us. Without this wo
cannot live. A man goes to Russia—he says he wants to work for Iskra
. . . Well? Of course he goes ... (but) what means have we in check-
ing these "agents", controlling them, allocating them to certain places?
Why, we cannot even get any letters out of them—and in nine oases out
of ten ... all our suppositions here about the future activity of an
agent go to the devil the day after he crosses the frontier and the
agent works as the spirit moves him.
2
Ideological control was also difficult. Occasionally Iskra agents would
decide that they no longer agree! with Iskra principles and would neglect to
1 Ibid
., p. 47.
2 Hill and Mudie, ojj. pit ., p. 160.
uinform the editors that they no longer wanted literature to be shipped to
them. Such was the case with L. I. Goldman who was a trusted Iskra agent
but who the editors disoovered was neglecting his Iskra work in favor of
printing and distributing Vpered . the Organ of the Kiev Russian Social-
Democratic group, and a newspaper ideologically close to "Eoonomism".1
Frequently agents would develop operational plana which would conflict with
those of the editors. Time was consumed and ill-feeling resulted before
the ensuing arguments and discussions were settled.
Not only the agents but also the local organizations managed to help
create problems for the editorial board. Occasionally a local group in Rus-
sia would find itself in a position to publish a local Social-Democratic
newspaper. The Iskra editors, and particularly Lenin, were critioal of any
attempts to do so. They deemed it essential that the only publications
printed were organizational-wide ones, and naturally that meant Iskra and
Zarya. One plan for a regional newspaper received from Lenin the harsh re-
ply that "we cannot conceal the fact that we . . . cannot agree with a single
part of the plan ... it is incredible ... I cannot imagine any more sui-
cidal tactics for Iskra ."2 The editors considered that only with a central-
ized publication could effective ideological control be maintained over Rus-
sian Social-Democracy, hence their attitude toward local publications.
Despite the many problems whioh surrounded the Iskra enterprise, definite
progress toward certain short-range goal3 oould be observed within two yeara
after the p aper was founded. For one thing, the use of agents in distribu-
ting Iskra and Zarva had resulted in the gradual development of a well organ-
1 Ibid ., p. 153.
2 Ibid., p. U9.
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ized secret apparatus composed of a tight band of professional revolution-
aries. The systematic distribution of revolutionary literature was by no
mean3 an Iskra monopoly, however; the organizational feature of a centralized
leadership directing a small group of conspirators was unique among revolu-
tionary enterprises at that time in Russia. 1 Although, as it has already
been mentioned, certain Iskra agents would occasionally prove uncontrollable,
this was apparently not the rule. More characteristic of the Islcra agent
was his severance from his own family, and his own city, for the sake of
revolutionary work. 2 The blind loyalty which many of the agents possessed
toward their organization is illustrated by the extreme punishment which ar-
rested agents would undergo and still refuse to reveal information which
would incriminate others in the organization. 3 As a rule, suoh a revolu-
tionist would simply reply to any questioning! "I have been a Social-Demo-
crat by conviction for a long time; I repudiate and deny the accusations a-
gainst mej I refuse to give testimony ... "4 Along with the revolutionaries
who devoted their entire lives to revolutionary work, the l3kra drew prom-
ising young men and women into discussion groups and into agitational work
among the laboring class, ffany of them were green and of no use to the move-
ment but some like Trotsky soon became a vital part of the Iskra organization.
In his autobiography, Trotsky epitomized the admiration which many of these
young intellectuals felt for Iskra when he 3aid: "I actually fell in love
with Iskra . and was so ashamed of my ignorance that I strained every nerve
1 Shub, ojB. oit.. p. 48.
2 Trotsky, Stalin , p. 39.
3 Ibid ., p. 120.
4 Ibid
., p. 37.
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in my effort to overcome it. "1 On the other extreme wa3 the woman student
who belonged to an Iskra group and confronted her chairman with the question,
"Can an Iskra adherent marry a navy officer? ".2
Not only did the Iskrovotsl manage to develop an impressive elite corps
of trained revolutionaries and a following among the intellectuals it also
attracted followers and supporters from the working classes. No statistics
are available which indicate the number of adherents to Iskrovotsl during
this period which came from this group but impressions can be drawn from the
statements of persons familiar with the organization during the early 1900 's.
The number of agents at any single time probably was not more than twenty
or thirty but the number of workers who at least occasionally attended clan-
destine Iskra meetings regularly or read and agreed with Iskrovotsl literature
was possibly over five thousand. 3 In a statement which 3hould certainly be
viewed with some scepticism, Lenin noted that in 1901 - 1903, "46 out of ev-
ery 100 political offenders (those arrested by the Russian Government) already
sane (from the worker group) as against 37 from the intellectuals ... and
the overwhelming majority supported the Iskra . "A Suffice it to say that
during this period the Iskrovotsl was gaining in strength among those suscep-
tible to revolutionary propaganda.
A third area of advancement came in the fight against the "Economistio"
tendency. Iikra's crusade against "Eoonomism" tended not only to win con-
verts but also to emphasize and enhance the cleavage between the two tendencies
1 Trotsky, f& Life.. P. 1U.
2 Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 42.
3 Trotsky, Stalin
, p. 39.
* Lenin, pjj. si£., p. 60.
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of Russian Social-Democracy. Popov, the Soviet Russian historian claimed
that by 1903 the Iskrovotsl had von a oomplete victory over "Soonomlsm".!
This statement tends to be refuted by the fact that there was by no means
oomplete ideological unanimity at the Second Congress held late in 1903 by
the Sooial-Demooratio groups of Russia, but nevertheless, the widely read
Iskra was unquestionably a principal factor in the gradual conversion of
many Social-Democrats to the idea of an Immediate political revolution and
other features of Iskrovotsl .
Along with its battle against "Economism" the Iskrovotsi was building
up interest in a congress as a possible means of uniting the entire Russian
Social-Democratic party under one fighting banner. Through their agents
and with their publications the Iskrovotsl promoted the idea of a congress
and saw to it by various means that their particular view-points would be
in the majority at such a congress. Iskra 's part in the activities leading
to the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic party was an important
one and so the Congress itself could be considered a major achievement of
the Iskra organization during the years, 1900 - 1903. This will be consider-
ed further in the next chapter which is devoted to an exposition of the e-
vents proceeding the Congress, the Congress itself, and the conclusion.
1 Popov, ojb. fiit., p. 76.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH
Pre-Congress Preparations
Although the Iskrovotsi had agitated and planned for a congress of
all of the Russian Social-Democrats sinoe early in 1901, the first attempt
actually to call suoh a congress was not thelr's. In early May, 1901, the
League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad attempted to convene a congress.
Too little publicity had been given to the plan and therefore the congress
was unsuccessful. The second attempt to call a congress took place in Rus-
sia. In March, 1902, the League with the support of the Jewish Bund met in
Bialystok, Russia, for that purpose. The Iskra organization was highly crit-
ical of this attempt for two reasons. The first was that they felt that the
educational and organizational work undertaken by them was far from complete.
To call a congress at that time would have been pre-mature and would have a
disruptive rather than a unifying effect on the movement. This was the rea-
son which they publicized in their newspaper. The more important reason was
undoubtedly this: In taking the initiative for calling a congress the Bund
and the League would also be expected to assume the credit for any successes.!
The editors of Iskra had agitated for an Iskra-oontrolled congress too much
to let another group or groups disrupt their plans. Ostensibly, the Iskro-
vot3l agreed to the calling of a congress and sent their delegate, Theodor
Dan. Owin^ to the small number of delegates at the congress, Dan was able
\
1 Lenin, on., eit., p. 538.
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to convince the groups present that the Bialystok Congress should be de-
clared void. It was decided to lable the gathering a conference whioh had
as its sole purpose the setting up of an Organizational Committee for con-
vening a bona-fide Second Congress. The Iskrovotsi had won a tactical vic-
tory. Prom that moment, the editors of Iskra devoted themselves to the task
of calling a oongress whioh could be controlled by the l3krovotsl .
With the exception of one delegate, all members of the Organizational
Committee elected at the Bialystok conference were arrested within a month
after the meetings had been adjourned. These arrests gave the l3kra organ-
ization an excellent opportunity to reconstitute the Organizational Commit-
tee to suit themselves. The opportunity was not lost. In November, 1902,
Iskra agents in Pskov called for an election of a new committee. This move
had been carefully engineered by Lenin who during the preceding summer had
written letters to Iskra agents in whioh he made known the wishes of the
editorial board concerning congress and also proposed directions for the
agents to follow. Such a letter follows?
And so your task now is to create out of yourself a Committee for
the preparation of the Congress
. . .
push your people on to as many
Committees as possible (particularly "Economist" groups and organiza-
tions) taking the utmost care of yourself and of your people until the
Congress. ... Remember this! Be bolder in this; more ingenious and
in other ways quieter and more cautious . . . Be wise as serpents and
gentle as doves.
. .
.1
At the Pskov Conference (November, 1902) the Iskrovotsi were represent-
ed by two of the three committee members who attended. As a result of several
co-optations necessitated by the arrest of committee members, the Organization-
al Committee underwent further change after November. Again the Iskrovotsi
1 Hill and Mudie, op., aii., p. 156.
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took advantage of the situation and through clever manipulation they continu-
ed to pack the Organizational Committee with their men. E|y the time of the
official Congress the Committee consisted of the following! G. M. Krzhlzha-
novsky, F, V. Lengnik, P. A. Krasikov, and E. M. Alexandrova—representing
the Iskra organization; V. N. Rozanov and E. Y. Levin—representing Yuzhnv
Rabochv which by 1902 supported Iskra on most major issues; and K. Portnoy,
representing the Bund .l With the Organizational Committee so completely in
their hands, the editors of Iskra began to direct the immediate work of pre-
paring for the Second Congress. One of their chief functions was to prepare
a programme and an agenda of topios which were to be taken up at the Congress.
Once prepared, the programme and the agenda would receive the immediate en-
dorsement of the Organizational Committee, but first the editors had to agree
among themselves on the features to be inoluded in each. This they found to
be difficult, particularly in the case of the programme.
Late in 1901, the other editors commissioned Plekhanov to compose a
programme to be submitted at the Congress. In January, 1902, Plekhanov com-
pleted his draft and it immediately became the oenter of a heated argument
between him and Lenin. First, Lenin criticized the general tone of the pro-
gramme. He felt that it was too abstract, unpractical, and pedagogic He
called it a "programme for students," and not a programme for an actual fight-
ing party. Plekhanov *s draft first sought to teach the Russian Social-Demo-
crats the theoretical generalizations of Marxism, and only in the tenth of
the twelve sections did it deal with special Russian problems of a praotical
nature. 3 Lenin further objected to Plekhanov's exclusion of the principle of
1 Lenin, qq, cit., p. 540.
j Popov, ob. cit.. p. 98.
3 Wolfe, oj>. cit .. p. ZUU.
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the dictatorship of the proletariat. Greater emphasis, he argued, should
be given to the hopelessness of the position of the small independent pro-
ducers and to the proletarian ola33 character of Social-Democracy,
1
After considerable debate with Plekhanov, Lenin drew up his own draft
programme and submitted it to a vote among the editors. Feelings among the
editors became so outraged at the debates which followed that an arbitration
oommittee composed of Zasulitch, Martov, and Theodor Dan was 3et up. A vote
was taken among the editors and Lenin's draft was voted down, five to one.
The arbitration committee composed a compromise draft which attempted to re-
concile the differences between Plekhanov and Lenin.2 The new draft was es-
sentially Plekhanov's with a few important exceptions.
One feature which Lenin was able to insert in the compromise draft was
that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Among all the existing pro-
grammes of the European Socialist parties, the Iskra programme was the only
one to contain such a point. Lenin formulated it for the draft in the fol-
lowing words: "An essential condition for the social revolution is the dicta-
torship of the proletariat, i. e., the conquest by the proletariat of such
political power as will permit it to suppress all attempts at resistance on
the part of the exploiters. »* Also Lenin submitted the portion of the pro-
gramme which dealt with the agrarian question in Russia. In this section
Lenin demanded the nationalisation of all the estates of Russian landlords.
Both Plekhanov and Axelrod at first argued that this would be impossible in
a strictly bourgeois revolution. In the correspondence which followed, tempers
1 Popov, loc.. cit .
J Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, £2. cit .. p. 56.3 Quotation from: Popov, ojj. ai£., p. 10A.
82
reached a white-hot condition. In Miy, 1902, Lenin wrote Plekhanovj
I have reoeived my article (The Agrarian Programme of Russian
Social-Democracy ) with your remarks. You hava a fine idea of tact with
regard to your colleagues on the editorial board ! ... If your aim
is to make mutual work impossible—then the way you have chosen will
very rapidly help you to aueicad. Aa for our personal ... relations,
you have finally spoilt t> .1
Despite Lenin's objections, the problem of land reform was given only
brief mention in the programme. The final draft of the programme which was
published and distributed amo-? Iskra agents was essentially an exposition
of the fundamental theses of lferx and Engels on the subject of the social
revolution, the transfer of power to the working class, and the "expropropri-
atlon of the expropriators ".2 It was divided into two parts, maximum and
minimum. The former demanded all-out social revolution and the establish-
ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the latter called for the end
of Caarism, a demooratio republic, and legislative measures on behalf of the
workers and peasants. Obviously, the minimum program was directed toward
at least partially appeasing the *Koonoml3ts and so was never intended to
represent the major goal of the movement. Once Lenin recognized that he had
lost his battle for the adoption of all his own ideas he cooled off and was
quite pleased with the compromise programme.
*
The agenda of topics which were to be discussed by the delegates at the
Congress was formulated by Lenin with the assistance of the other editors.
No major arguments developed around the discussion of the agenda but almost
daily there were minor tussles among the editors for a variety of reasons.
By the time the editors transferred operations from London to Geneva in 1903
1 Hill and Mudie, SB, alt. , p. 155.
2 Popov, log. cit .
3 Wolfe, 2£. sit., p. 230.
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cooperative work va3 aooomplished with difficulty. Potre3ov, who often
sided with Lenin, reported that, "it wa3 impossible to work with him . . .
because
. .
. the slightest disagreement with him became a serious contro-
versy and affected our personal relations.".^ The editorial board became
more conclusively divided between the older and the younger members. Again
Lenin brought up the proposal of Trotsky as a seventh member of the board.
Again Plekhanov protested. In a rage Lenin, according to his wife, said,
"A damned fine state of affairs ... nobody has enough courage to reply to
Plekhanov
. .
. Plekhanov trounces Trotsky and Vera (Zasulitch) jU3t says»
Just like our George. 1 ". 2
As the date set for the Congress approaohed, and as delegates from
Russia began to come to Geneva, the editors rose above their differences and
managed to present a united front. 3 The last issue of Iskra preceding the
Congress was on a superior intellectual level and the general view was that
everything would go well during and following the Congress.^ This spirit
of optimism would seem to be unwarranted by the prior conditions. None-the-
less on July 30, 1903, in Brussels, Belgium, the Second Congress of Russian
Social-Democrats was convened with no premonition of other than outstanding
achievement and success.
The Congress Meets
Just as with a secret newspaper, a secret Congress presented unusual
difficulties. It did not prove at all easy to organise the Congress in Brus-
sels. A friend of Plekhanov's named Koltsov was living in Brussels during
» Quotation from! Popov, £%. pit ., p. 57.
2 Quotation from: Krupskaya, 2B.. clt .. p. 64-.
3 Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 27.
• Krupskaya, og. clt., p. 65.
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1903 and had undertaken to arrange for the Congress. The delegates were in-
structed to contact Koltsov when they arrived in Brussels. After about four
Russians had called to see him, the landlady told the Koltsovs that she would
not tolerate any more suoh visits. Koltsov's wife was forced to stand all the
next day at the street corner, catch the delegates and send them to a social-
ist hotel, the Cgg, d.'0r, where they might find more agreeable lodging.1
The first meeting of the Congress was held at the headquarters of a labor
cooperative society in the tfaison dji Peuole . which was located in the working
class districts of Brussels. The storeroom was sufficiently secluded and so
it was chosen as the congressional hall. In the room there wa3 praotically
no light and ventilation and only enough chairs for a few of the members; the
rest were forced to sit on rough damp boards and bales of wool. As soon as
the first meeting got under way the delegates began to fidget about. Within
a few minutes some of the delegates sneaked out of the storeroom and when a-
bout half were gone, a motion was unanimously carried to adjourn. An invisible
army of fleas had upset the first meeting of the Second Congress of the Russian
Social-Democrats S2 Trotsky referred to these vermin in his autobiography as
"Unsele's Army" (Ansele was one of the leaders of the Socialist party in Bel-
gium.3 For reasons of physical comfort but mainly for purposes of security
the sessions in Brussels moved from one site to another, making use of garages,
warehouses, and the back-rooms of trade-union halls.
Bven such precautions as were taken by the delegates wore not enough.
In less than a week the Congress was upset by the local Belgian police. The
1 Krupskaya, p£. ait ., p. 66.
2 Minc-Engeia-Lenin Institute, 2E. oit . . p. 59.
3 Trotsky, !fc Life , p. 158.
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police had been disturbed from the first by the influx of so many foreigners
and had suspected that an anarchist conspiracy waa in the making. From the
first day, the delegates were shadowed by secret service men but it was only
after their purpose was established by the head of the Russian secret ser-
vice in Berlin that the Belgian police acted. The Russian secret service
chief, a man named Harting, had been informed of the Congress by, inter-
estingly enough, a trusted member of the Organisational Committee, Dr.
Zhitomirsky. Besides being in the Arrangements seation of the Organiza-
tional Committee, Dr. Zhitomirsky was also secretly an agent-provocateur for
the Czar. As the various details for the Congress were worked out, Zhi-
tomirsky would simply relay them to the proper police authorities.* In the
realm of conspiracy and revolution even one's own friends must be suspect.
Trotsky moralized on this incident by saying: "It would seem as if Czarism
held all the strings. And yet even this did not save it.".
2
Invitations were extended by the police to the delegates to leave Bel-
gium in twenty-four hours. Consequently, the Congress was forced to transfer
to another country. England was chosen because of the many connections which
the Iskra editors had there. The remaining sessions of the Congress took place
in London at quarters furnished by the English Social-Democrats.
Counting both those in Brussels and in London, the Congress held thirty-
seven sessions as well as innumerable supplementary meetings. In all there
were forty-three delegates with voting rights at the Congress. The composi-
tion of the Congress had been determined before-hand by the Organizational
J
IMd.., p. 159.
2 Loa.. cit .
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Committee. Considering this it is not at all surprising that at the first
S8S3ion there were thirty-one Iskrovotsi 8 only three Bundlsts ; two Rabochava
Delo-ist8 t tvra Yuzhnv-Rabochv-ists t and six who were labeled the "Marsh" be-
cause they weren't committed to any specific group and tended to waver from
one to another.1 Nine delegates were given double votes because they re-
presented both a Russian organization and an emigre group. Such was the case
of Lenin and Martov who represented both the Iskra organization abroad and
also committees in Russia. Ten other delegates were given consultative votes
whioh gave them a voioe in the proceedings but no actual voting power. In
all, the Iskra organization began at the Congress with thirty-three votes
from their own groups including one vote from the St. Petersburg League of
Struggle. This organization was split into a worker's organization which
supported the Raboohaya Delo and a political organization which supported
Iskra . Each group was allowed one voting delegate whioh tended to nullify
their efforts. Along with these there were four votes from Ynzhnv Rabochv
which were considered to be Iskrovotsi votes. The delegates at the Congress
represented twenty-six scattered groups in all, many of which were in exile.
2
The delegation was composed mainly of intellectuals and professional revolu-
tionaries. Only three workers were present; and this at a Congress directed
to the cause of the Russian proletariat
!
With the Congress so carefully and successfully packed in favor of the
Iskrovotsi it could be assumed that most of the major issues would be settled
with little debate in a rubber-stamp fashion. Such was not the case. As will
1 Lenin, op., clt .. p. 341.
2 Schuman, ojj. oit .. p. iO,
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be seen In the next section, a split took place among the Iskrovotsi whioh
had important consequences in both the settling of issues at the Congress
and in the events which followed the Congress.
The Debates and Business of the Congress
The Congress opened in an atmosphere of harmony and accord among the
Iskrovotsi . Preceding the first official meeting a secret and informal
meeting of the Iskra organization had been held concerning mandates. At
that time, although imperative mandates had been outlawed by the rule3 of
the Congress, an "amicable" agreement wa3 reached in which all the members
of the Iskra organization agreed to vote together whenever a critical issue
arose.1 The decision of this secret meeting was faithfully carried out until
the mid-point of the Congress. At that time events took place which made
certain l3kra delegates reassess their allegiance to any mandatory voting.
The result made possible the division of the history of the Congress into
two parts. The early part being one of essentially mutual agreement among
the Iskrovotsi and the second being one of serious disagreement.
Before the business of the Congress could actually get under way a
Presidium had to be set up for controlling the meetings. Lenin, realizing
the necessity of enforcing discipline from the start, pushed through a mo-
tion which set up a Presidium consisting entirely of Iskra men, with Plekhanov
a3 Chairman and himself and Pavlovich-Krasikov as Vice-chairmen. Despite
protests that the procedure was undemocratic the motion carried. * The first
important items of business on the agenda which had been written by Lenin and
adopted by the Organizational Committee concerned the plaoe of the Jewish
1 Lenin, 0£. cit.. p. 54-3.
2 Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, od,. cit .. p. 60.
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in the Party and the adoption of the programme which had been formu-
lated by the Iakrovotsi .
The Jewish Bund had come to the Congress determined to maintain their
autonomy in the handling of specifically Jewish problems and also to assert
the claim to represent all the Jewish socialists in Russia. Actually, the
Bund wa3 a powerful socialist organization at that time and had done nuoh
toward unifying the Jewish peoples in Russia under a program of Jewish nation-
alism and socialism. While the l3krovotsi recognized these features of the
Jewish question they also realized that to grant autonomy to one minority
nationality would be to give tacit assent to other such arrangements. The
result would be a federated rather than a centralized Soeial-Demooratio party.1
Naturally enough, Lenin and Plekhanov were against the Jewish plan for auto-
nomy but, more important, so were Martov, Trotsky, and Axelrod, all assimilat-
ed Jews. No immediate means of compromise were seen so it was decided to
discuss the programme issue before voting on the question of the Bund .
The debate on the programme was an a]mo3t endless process. A determin-
ed minority of "Economist" delegates forced the adoption of a speoial pro-
gramme commission and started the debate on the programme in nearly twenty
full sessions of the Congress itself. 2 Since the Iskrovotsi had their dele-
gates so completely in control on this issue, the "Economists'" attempt to de-
feat the programme was basically futile and pedantic and they knew it. The
main fire of the opposition to the programme was direoted at the idea of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The programme also included as has been
1 Wolfe, op., clt.. p. 234.
2 Ibld. f p. 235.
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said, a minimum program containing demands for a constituent assembly, for
universal, direct, and equal suffrage, and for freedom of speech, press, and
assembly. The "Economists" were unable to reconcile these demands, of which
they heartily approved, with the idea of a dictatorship. An "Economist" dele-
gate, Akimov-Jfekhnovety aBked, "How do you reconcile your endorsement of a
dictatorship with that part of your draft which comes out for a demooratio
republic ... a constituent assembly . . . universal suffrage? Shall we,
representatives of those who suffer from dictatorship countenance its use
ourselves?".! Plekhanov's answer to these questions illustrated the un-
compromising, and strangely enough, the opportunistic nature of the Iskro-
votsi principle of centralism!
The fundamental principle of democracy is thist 3alus populi :
suprema lex (Not literally, but in the language of the revolution-
ist; The success of the revolution is the supreme law). If the suc-
cess of the revolution should demand the temporary limitation of any
one or other democratic principles it would be criminal to refrain
from 3ueh limitation.
2
Such statements as this one, which would be heartily endorsed by Lenin,
tended to bring him and Plekhanov closer together than they had been for
several months preceding the Congress. Other parts of the programme debat-
ed by the "Economists" were those concerning cooperation with the Liberals
and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and also Lenin's agrarian proposals. It
was decided that an attitude of cautious cooperation should be adopted toward
semi-revolutionary organizations outside of Russian Social-Democracy and toward
Lenin's agrarian proposals which had as their goal the eventual donation of
large portions of land to the peasants; land which at that time belonged to
» Quotation from: Loc . cit .
2 Quotation from! Popov, op.. oi£., p. 104.
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the large landlords of Russia. Despite the heated debates and lengthy ses-
sions, the programme was finally adopted by almost unanimous consent of all
who were at the particular session of the Congress at which the rote was
taken.
The fourth item on the agenda had to do with the ratification of the
line of the Central Organ. Naturally enough, Iskra was unanimously reoog-
nized as the Central Organ, with the delegation which represented Rabochava
Delo abstaining from the vote. Most delegates at the Congress recognized the
work which Iskra had done in building the party and organizing the Congress.
In the discussion which preceded the vote on this item, one of the "Economists"
brought up the question, "If we don't approve of the Iskra editorial board
(i.e., of Lenin, Martov, et cetra ) will it mean we only reoognize a name?".
2
The reply which Trotsky made is significant in respect to events later in
the Congress when the question of editors was broached. He answered, "We are
not approving a name ... but a standard ... around which our Party will
actually be built up. ",3 This was at the tenth session. Until that time
despite the lengthy discussions and squabbles there had been virtual agree-
ment on fundamental principles. In the sessions which immediately followed,
the debate centered on the set of party rules which, as with the agenda, were
mainly the work of Lenin, During these debates the first major split in the
Iskrovotsi took plaoe and the characteristic harmony of the first part of the
Congress was replaoed by a growing amount of deep-rooted disagreement.
In paragraph one of the rules were to be 3tated the conditions for
1 Wolfe, as., sit., p. 239.
* Quotation from: Krupskaya, ojj. elt . . p. 69.
3 Quotation from! Loc . cit .
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membership In the Russian Sooial-Demooratio party. Lenin remained consistent
in his desire for a highly centralized party organization. His formula for
paragraph one was as follows:
Membership of the party must be given a narrow definition so as to
distinguish those who work from those who talk, so as to get rid of
chaos in the matter of organization.!
Essentially Lenin wanted a party of professional revolutionaries. Only
those should be considered members of the party who paid membership dues, ac-
cepted the platform, joined a local organization of the party, took active
part in its work, and subjected themselves to its direction.
Martov immediately presented a proposal counter to Lenin'3. He desir-
ed that the party be open to all workers and intellectuals who believed in
its programme. He considered it sufficient that a member would work under
the general control of the organization but need not join a local organiza-
tion or be especially active in any revolutionary work. Martov felt that
Lenin's formula would close the party to a large number of intellectuals and
sympathizers among the workers who would not risk joining a local underground
organization. Plekhanov sided with Lenin and argued with Martov in the fol-
lowing words:
I fail to understand ... why it is thought that Lenin'3 draft, if
adopted, would close the doors of our party to a large number of workers.
Workers desiring to join the party will not fear to attach themselves
to an organization
. . .
many intellectuals, however, will be afraid,
for they are thoroughly imbued with bourgeois individualism. But that
is all to the good
. . .
(for they are usually) opportunistic 2
3uch arguments failed to convince a great number of the Iskrovotsi.
Axelrod rallied to Martov's formula and joined in: "Is not Lenin dreaming
1 Lenin, og. e£t., p. 349.
2 Quotation from: Popov, oj). git., p. 111.
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of the administrative subordination of an entire party to a feu guardians
of doctrine?". 1 Perhaps this is exactly what Lenin was "dreaming" of—but
characteristically hs saw no harm in such dictatorial plans. Under the
conditions which revolutionary work had to be carried out Lenin, however,
would seem to have a valid reason for demanding limited party membership.
In the following statement he emphasized this reason:
Martov's formula stretched the boundaries of the party. He argu-
ed that our party must become a party of the masses ... In the con-
ditions in which we have to work this is very dangerous, because it
would make it very diffioult to draw a line between a revolutionary
and an idle talker.
2
After two full sessions, many votes on procedure and two roll calls the
vote on the first paragraph of the rules was officially tabulated at twenty-
eight to twenty-two in favor of Martov's formula. The first major split a-
mong the Iskrovotsl had ocourrsd. Among the editors, Lenin and Plekhanov had
voted together against Martov, who was supported by Potresov, Axelrod, and
Zasulitch. The Bundist3 and the delegation representing Rabochaya Delo had
recognized the significance of the debate and sided with Martov. They con-
sidered that Martov's proposal would lead to less strict control over separate
party organizations and thus thsy mi<;ht yet gain the autonomy which they de-
sired.
Lenin was outraged at the defeat. He believed that Martov's formula
would jeoprodize much of the work which had planned for the future. But
more important he also realized that with the Iskrovotsl support of Martov
backed by the Bund and Rabochaya Delo . he had little chance of other than
defeat on any contested Issues. His position of leadership at the Congress
1 Quotation from: Wolfe, oj>. cit .. p. 24.
2 Lenin, od,. cit .. p. 373.
93
had gone sour and he knew it.* Fortunately for Lenin, the remainder of the
paragraphs of the rule3 were debated and passed without significant rovision.
Martov, then, did not make U3e of his new position of power when he might
have and events soon caused the pendulum to swing once more in Lenin's favor.
The next critical issue to be decided was that of membership both of the
Central Organ and of the Central Committee. In the agenda whioh Lenin had
drawn up for the Congress he had suggested under point twenty-three that the
old editorial board which had proved unworkable be dissolved. In its place
was to be elected a group of three editors. The same plan w»3 suggested for
the Organizational Committee which was to be re-oonstituted as the Central
Committee of the party with administrative duties inside Russia. Apparently
this plan had brought forth no disagreement among the editors during the early
sessions of the Congress. However, Martov became convinced that the plan was
directed against him and that it would tend to enhance Lenin's power in the
party. If point twenty-three had come to a vote immediately after Martov's
victory on the issue of party membership it would undoubtedly have been deoid-
ed in his favor. unfortunately for Martov, however, this was not the case.
Lenin very cleverly forced the vote on the question of the Bund and was suc-
cessful in vetoing the Bundists ' federative aspirations. The Bundists were
incensed; they immediately left the Congress and declared their secoession
from the party. Thus Martov lost five allies. Next Lenin followed up this
advantage with a motion calculated to drive out another group of his opponents.
He moved to dissolve Rahoohava Delo and give exclusive recognition to Iskra .
Martov as a loyal Iskrovotsi fell into the trap and voted in favor of the
1 Trotsky, Russian Revolution, p. 63.
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motion. Thereupon the two Rabochava Delo delegates who had supported him
In hia vote on paragraph one of the rules withdrew from the Congress. Lenin's
minority of five or six was thus converted to a majority of two votes.^ The
two voting groups, Martov's and Lenin's were finally decisively split. Each
group began to hold private, unofficial gatherings and even adopted separate
names. Lenin's group became the Bolsheviki (Majority) and Martov's, the
Menshevlkl (Minority). Although these names were not always applicable after
the Congress since frequently the Mensheyiks were in the majority, Lenin
realized the psychological advantage of the Bolshevik title and retained it
for many years. 2
The debate on the membership of the Central Organ and the Central Com-
mittee was a bitter one. Martov, backed by Axelrod, Zasulitch, and Potresov
of the lakra editors, protested any plan to depose any of the original six
editors. It had become clear in preliminary discussions that any new com-
bination of three would include Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov. Axelrod and
Zasulitch opposed 3uch an arrangement because they feared the consequences of
being removed from the editorial board. I3kra had been their one connection
with Russia and after so many years in exile they clung to that connection al-
most as if life or death depended upon it. 3 Martov's reason for opposing
such an arrangement was that he feared, and realistically enough, that he
would be in the minority and be outvoted on every issue. Then, too, he had
been close friends of Axelrod, Potresov, and Zasulitch and he persuaded him-
self that he would be letting them down if he voted in favor of the editorial
1 Wolfe, oji. ci£.
,
p. 244.
2 Heeker, op., sll-t P' 50.
3 Krupskaya, op., sit., p. 38.
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triumvirate. Lenin had several reasons for desiring a restrioted member-
ship of the editorial board. Lenin first claimed that the old *roup of six,
"was so unworkable that it had not met in full once in the course of three
years. ".1 Next he asserted that only with a more restrioted, workable edi-
torial board would it be possible to bring about the political consolidation
necessary for revolutionary activities in Russia. 2 And Trotsky gave as Lenin's
reason for wanting the new arrangement the desire to get Axelrod and Zasulitch
off the editorial board.
3
The struggle became acute during the elections. N. K. Krupskaya record-
ed such scenes as the following!
(In) another scene I remember Deutsch was angrily reprimanding
Noskov about something. The latter raised his head, and with gleaming
eyes said bitterly: "Tou just keep your mouth shut, you old dodderer!"^
Martov argued that the voting on the two groups of three represented "a state
of siege" in the party and that Lenin was forcing "Exceptional laws against
individual persons and groups ".5 Martov also raised the point that earlier
in endorsing the Iskra as the Central Organ, he had also tacitly endorsed the
old editorial board. Since both he and Trotsky at that time had answered
Akimov-Makhnovety's criticism with the statement that an approval of Iskra
meant only an approval of the newspaper and not the staff itself, the point
was lost. Lenin's forcefulness and his pressure tactics were making them-
selves felt. Martov interrupted the voting with a cry that it was a slur on
his political reputation. Trotsky and others followed with assents. Plekhanov
1 Lenin, 0£. sit.
, p. 351.
I XMi., p. 363.
3 Trotsky, Mv. Life , p. 161.
J
Krupskaya, pjj. cit., p. 78.
5 Quotation from! Lenin, £2. fii£. , p. 264.
96
and Lenin protested against the interruptions and Lenin asked the secretaries
to enter in the minutes that "Comrades Zasulitch, Martov, and Trotsky inter-
rupted him and that the number of interruptions be recorded.". 1
Uhen a motion to re-elect the old editorial board was defeated, the out-
raged minority refused thenceforward to vote on any question. Plekhanov,
Lenin, and hfertov were elected editors of the Central Organ. Noskov, Krzhi-
zhanovsky, and Lengnik, all Lenin' 3 men, were elected to the Central Commit-
tee. Each of these bodies was to name two men to a Party Council of five for
which the Congress chose a chairman, Plekhanov. The voting on these member-
ships had been unanimous: twenty-two for, twenty refused to vote, and two
deposited blank ballots.
tfertov refused to accept the editorship and he and his group ceased to
participate in any more of the activities of the Congress. The split had
come and in the years following the Congress it wa3 to be a serious barrier
to any concerted party projects. Before the voting was complete on the ques-
tion of the Central Organ and the Central Committee Lenin pushed through a
proposal to subordinate the Central Committee to the Central Organ. Although
he could hope to control both groups, the Organ being outside of Russia would
be the easiest to control. Trotsky who had sided with the minority accosted
Lenin with the statement that, "I had come (to the Congress) with the idea
that the Central Organ must 'subordinate' itself to the Central Committee."
"That won't do," Lenin replied, "That is oontrary to the relative strength.
How can they direct us from Russia? . . . Vfe are the stable center and shall
direct from here." "But that means complete dictatorship of the Central
1
BttUi P. 365.
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Organ," Trotsky answered. "What is there bad about that?" Lenin replied,
"In the present situation it cannot be otherwise. ",1 Charaoteristioally
Lenin wa3 to change his mind on this point for he 30on lost control of the
Central Organ. Still later he lost control of the Central Committee and he
then decided to defy both bodies and set up his own caucus committee. Con-
sistency seemed to be one of Lenin's virtues only when it enhanced his desire
for power and leadership. This desire seems to be the key to understanding
Lenin's actions at the Congress.
With the abstaining of the Martovists, the remainder of the Congress was
without important incidents. Debates were desultory and largely without
meaning. Resolutions were adopted on such subjects as local organizations,
demonstrations^ anti-Jewi3h pogroms, and tactics. 2 The hfartovists spent
their time asking each other how Lenin was able to do what he did. Trotsky
recorded Axelrod as asking, "How could he (Lenin) have the nerve to do it?
Was it so long a»o that he came abroad as a mere pupil and behaved as a pupil?
. . .
Where then did he get that supreme self confidence? . 3 The answer was
that Lenin had the nerve. He was capable of assuming direct leadership at
the expense of friends and relationships no matter how much sentiment was
involved. Flekhanov had said it but salua popull : suprema lex , would seem
to have been endorsed also by Lenin without reservation. On Saturday, August 23
at five o'clook in the afternoon the Congress drew to a close. In the fol-
lowing two hours the delegates, almost appearing to be somnambulists, passed
a half dozen more resolutions and adjourned for the last. time.
4
1 Quotations from: Trotsky, Russian Revolution , p. 42.
J Popov, flp. flit., p. lff«
3 Quotation from! Trotsky, J£r Life , p. 162.
4 Wolfe, op.. £i£., p. 248.
98
The immediate significance of the 3ongre33 lay almost entirely in the
fact that a split had occurred in the Russian Social-Democratic party. The
measures adopted by the Congress never played an important part in the future
Communist Party beoause they became so engulfed by the bitter struggle for
power between the tfen3heviks and the Bolsheviks which followed the Congress.
The Congress was the final act in the preparatory period of Russian
Social-Democracy. It did positive work in actually creating at least sever-
al general theoretical principles which helped establish Russian Social-
Democracy among the proletariat of Russia and it brought to a olimax the
struggle between the "hard" elements represented by Lenin and later the
Bolshevik party, and the "soft" elements represented first by the "Economists"
and after the Congress by the Menshevlks . The influence of Iskra as it was
originally constituted in 1900 was brought to a close by the events which
followed the Congress. It was finished as an expression of Lenin's views
within four months after the Congress but it was not until late in 1904. that
Lenin was able to re-enforce hi3 influence with another newspaper.
During the months following the Second Congress until the Russian Revolu-
tion of 1905, the most Important efforts of both the Bolsheviks and the tten-
shevlks were directed at the struggle over the party centers (i.e., the Organ
and the Committee). Lenin and Plekhanov continued to edit Iskra until November
of the same year as the Congress. Plekhanov in the meantime had begun to re-
gret his haste in dissociating himself from his friends who were now Hen-
sheviks
.
This coupled with the fact that most of the finaneial support for
Iskra had come from persons who now supported the hfensheviks forced Plekhanov
to re-evaluate his poaition. In early November, over Lenin's protest, Plek-
hanov co-optated the entire pre-Congress Iskra editorial board. Lenin's hand
was forced and he resigned from the editorial board. Number 52 of Iskra issued
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on November 7, 1903 was edited by Plekhanov alone. Thereafter the news-
paper was controlled exclusively by the Menshevik section of the Russian
Social-Democratic party.1
Lenin, without an organ with which to guide his following was in a
difficult position, By the spring of 1904 the Central Committee in Russia
renounced the Bolshevik seotion of the party and began to support the Men-
sheviks . Lenin was without a single official instrument of power. During
the summer of 1904 Lenin attempted no activities which might help him re-
cover the ground he had lo3t, but by September he was encouraged by a number
of new supporters. Just as he had thought of the Iskra a3 being absolutely
essential to the unifying of the party, so he began to think of establish-
ing another newspaper to help him regain his lost position. In Geneva, on
December 23, 1904, Lenin, with the help of other Bolsheviks wa3 able to an-
nounce !
Our newspaper Vpered (Forward) came out yesterday. All the Bol-
sheviks are rejoicing and are enoouraged. ... At last we have broken
up the cursed dissension and ure working harmoniously. ... A good
group of literary collaborators has been gotten together; there are
fresh foroe3, little money, but soon we must reoeive some. The Cen-
tral Committee who betrayed us has lost all credit.
. . .
The Bolshe-
vik Committees -are Joining together, they have already chosen a Bu-
reau and now the Organ will completely unite them. Hurrah fi
In the meantime the Mensheviks with the support of both the party cent-
ers were restating the philosophy of the revolutionary movement which they
hoped to lead. VJhat was originally nothing more than a difference among
personalities at the Congress gradually deepened into a difference on princi-
ples. Essentially, they adopted the "minimum" part of the programme as their
1 01»a Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher, T^e Bolsheviks and the World Max
(Stanford University, California i Stanford University Press, 1940), p. 756.
2 Hill and Mudie, o£. cl£., p. 224.
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immediate Russian goals. Trotsky and ffertov became their chief spokesmen and
these two attempted in rany different ways to conciliate the various other
revolutionary groups in Russia. It was in conciliation rather than antagon-
ism that they hoped to gain their objectives. Because of this attitude, the
whole complexion of Iskra after issue number 52, was radically changed. Af-
ter number 52, the Iskra of uncompromising centralism, Lenin's Iskra was no
1 I. 0. Ifertov, The State and the Socialist Revolution (New York:
International Review, 1938), p. 9.
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SUMMARY
An attempt has been made in this thesis to evaluate the influence of a
newspaper on a revolutionary movement. Since the years 1900 to 1904. were
years primarily dedicated by Russian Social-Democracy to discussion and not
to revolution, the end results could not be measured in governments over-
thrown or monarchs deposed. Iskra's significance lay in three different
fields. First, it was influential in helping to develop the Russian Social-
Democratic organization. Its greatest positive work was done in thi3 field
even before the Second Congress was called. Secondly, it provided a spawn-
ing ground for the growth of leaders in the movement. Lenin, Martov, Trotsky,
were only a few of the future leaders of the Russian Communistic state who
developed their abilities through their activities on Iskra . Finally, the
Iskra helped establish a Congress which, though it resulted in a schism, was
absolutely essential in the chain of events which led to the Russian Revo-
lution of 1917. The Congress brought the two basic viewpoints of Sooial-
Democracy into the open where they might be accepted or rejected without a
mincing of words. Without thi3 development, which gave birth to Bolshevism
as a recognized tendency, the Revolution of 1917 might well have taken a
vastly different path.
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Declaration By The Editorial Board of Iskra1
In undertaking the publication of a politioa]. newspaper, Iskra . we con-
sider it necessary to say a few words about our aims and what we understand
our tasks to be.
Me are passing through an extremely important period in the history of
the Russian labour movement and of Russian Social-Democracy. The pa3t few
years have been marked by an astonishingly rapid spread of Social-Democratic
ideas among our intellengentsia, and coming forward to meet this tendency of
social idea3 is the movement of the industrial proletariat, which arose inde-
pendently, and which is beginning to unite and to fight against it3 oppressors,
is beginning eagerly to strive towards socialism. Circles of workers and Soc-
ial-Democratic literature i3 increasing and is far outstripping the supply,
while the intensified persecution by the government is powerless to restrain
this movement. The prisons and the places of exile are filled to overflow-
ing. Hardly a month goes by without our hearing of Socialists being "dis-
covered" in all parts of Russia, of the capture of literature-carriers, and
the confiscation of literature and printing presses—but the movement goes
on and grows, spreads to a wider area, penetrates more and more deeply into
the working class, and attracts increasing public attention to itself. The
entire economic development of Russia, the history 0*" the development of
social ideas in Russia and of the Russian revolutionary movement serve as a
guarantee that the Russian Social-Democratic labour movement will grow and
ultimately surmount all the obstacles that confront it.
On the other hand, the principal feature of our movement, and one which
has become particularly marked in recent times is its state of disunity and
its primitive character—if one may so express it. Local circles spring up
and function independently of one another and (what is particularly impor-
tant) even of circles which have functioned and now function simultaneously
in the same district. Traditions are not established and continuity is not
maintained; the local literature entirely reflects this disunity and lack of
contact with what Russian Social-Democracy has already created.
This state of disunity runs counter to the requirements called forth by
the strength and breadth of the movement, and this, in our opinion, marks a
critical moment in its history. In the movement itself the need is strongly
felt for consolidation and for definite form and organization; and yet many
active Social-Democrats still fail to realize the need for the movement pass-
ing to a higher form. On the oontrary, among wide circles an ideological
wavering is observed, an absorption in the fashionable "criticism of Marxism"
and "Bernsteinism, " in spreading the views of the so-called "Economist" ten-
dency and, what is inseparably connected with it, the effort to keep the
movement at its lowest stage, an effort to push into the background the task
of forming a revolutionary party to lead the struggle at the head of the
whole people. It is a fact that such an ideological wavering is observed
1 Lenin, ojj. cit.
, pp. 3-8.
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among Russian Social-Demoerats, that narrow practical work carried on without
a theoretical conception of the movement aa a whole threatens to divert the
movement to a false path. No one who has direct knowledge of the state of
affairs in the majority of our organisations ha3 any doubt whatever on that
score. Moreover, literary productions exist which confirm this. It is suf-
ficient to mention the Credo which has already evoked legitimate protest,
the Special Supplement to Rabochava Hvsl (September 1399), which brought out
in such bold relief the tendency with which Rabochava Mvsl is thoroughly
imbued, and, finally, the Manifesto of the St. Petersburg Self-Emancipation
of the Working Cla33 group, drawn up in the spirit of this very Eeonomlsm.
The assertions made by Rabocheve Dyelo to the effect that the Credo merely
represents the opinions of individuals, that the tendency represented by
Rabochava Mvsl reflects merely the confusion of mind and the tactlessness of
it3 editors, and not a speoial tendency in the process of the Russian la-
bour movement are absolutely untrue.
Simultaneously with this, the works of authors whom the reading public
has with more or less reason regarded up to now as the prominent represen-
tatives of "le^al Marxism" more and more reveal a turn towards views approach-
ing those of bourgeois apologists. As a result of all this, we have the
confusion and anarchy which enabled the ex-Marxist, or to speak more correct-
ly, the ex-Socialist, Bernstein, in recounting his successes, to deolare
unchallenged in the press that the majority of Social-Democrats active in
Russia were his followers.
We do not desire to exaggerate the danger of the situation, but it would
be immeasurably more harmful to shut our eyes to it. That is why we welcome
with all our heart the deoision of the Emancipation of Labour group to re-
sume its literary activity and commence a systematic struggle against the
attempts to distort and vulgarize Sooial-D jraoy.
The practical conclusion to be drawn from all this is as follows: we
Russian Social-Demoorat3 must combine and direot all our efforts towards the
formation of a strong party that will fight under the united banner of re-
volutionary Social-Democracy. This is precisely the task that was outlined
by the Congress of 1898, at which the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party
was formed, and which published Its Manifesto.
We regard ourselves as members of this Party; we entirely agree with
the fundamental ideas contained in the Manifesto, and attach extreme impor-
tance to it as a public declaration of its aims. Consequently, for us, as
members of the Party, the question as to what our immediate and direct tasks
are presents it,3elf as follows! what plan of activity must we adopt in order
to revive the Party of the firmest possible basis?
The reply usually given to this question is that it is necessary to
elect a central Party institution once more and to instruct that body to re-
sume the publication of the Party organ. But in the confused period through
which we are now pa33ing such a simple method 13 hardly expedient.
To establish and consolidate the Party mean3 establishing unity among
all Russian Social-Democrats, and, for the reasons indicated above, such
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unity cannot be brought about by decree; It cannot be brought about by, let
us say, a meeting of representatives passing a resolution. Definite work
must be done to bring it about. In the first place, it is neoessary to
bring about unity of ideas which will remove the differences of opinion and
confusion that—we will be frank—reign among Russian Sooial-Democrats at
the present time. This unity of ideas must be fortified by a unified Party
programme. Secondly, an organisation must be set up especially for the pur-
pose of maintaining contact among all the oentres of the movement, for sup-
plying complete and timely information about the movement, and for regularly
distributing the periodical press to all parts of Russia. Only when we
have built such an organisation, or" then will it become a real factor and,
consequently, a mighty political force. To the first half of this task, i. e.,
creating common literature, consistent in principle and capable of ideo-
logically uniting revolutionary Social-Democracy, we intend to devote our
efforts, for we regard this as one of the pressing tasks of the present-day
movement and a necessary preliminary measure towards the resumption of Party
activity.
As we have already said, the intellectual unity of Russian Social-Dem-
ocrats has still to be established, and in order to achieve this it is neces-
sary, in our opinion, to have an open and thorough discussion of the funda-
mental principles and tactical questions raised by the present-day Economists,
Bernsteinists and "critics. " Before we can unite, and in order that we may
unite, we must first of all firmly and definitely draw the lines of demarca-
tion. Otherwise, our unity will be merely a fictitious unity, which will
conceal the prevailing confusion and prevent its complete elimination. Nat-
urally, therefore, we do not intend to utilise our publication merely as a
storehouse for various views. On the contrary, we shall conduct it along the
lines of a strictly defined tendency. This tendency can be expressed by
the word Marxism, and there is hardly need to add that we stand for the con-
sistent development of the ideas of Marx and Engels, and utterly reject the
half-way, vaiie and opportunistic emendations which have now become so fash-
ionable as a result of the legerdemain of Ed. Bernstein, P. Struve and many
others. But while discussing all questions from our own definite point of
view, we shall not rule out of our columns polemics between comrades. Open
polemics within the sight and hearing of all Russian Social-Democrats and
class conscious workers are neoessary and desirable, in order to explain the
profound differences that exist, to obtain a comprehensive discussion of
disputed questions, and to combat the extremes into which the representatives,
not only of various views, but also of various localities or various "crafts"
in the revolutionary movement inevitably fall. As has already been stated,
we also consider one of the drawbacks of the present-day movement to be the
absence of open polemics among th039 holding arowedly differing views, an
effort to conceal the differences that exist over extremely serious questions.
We shall not enumerate in detail all the questions and themes included
in the programme of our publication, for this programme automatically emerges
from the general conception of what a political newspaper, published under
present conditions, should be.
We shall exert every effort to persuade every Russian comrade to regard
our publication as his own, as one to which every group should communicate
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information concerning the movement, in which to relate its experiences, ex-
press its views, its literature requirements, its opinions on Social-Dem-
ocratic publications, in fact to make it the medium through which it can share
with the other groups the contribution it makes to the movement and what it
receives from it. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a gen-
uinely all-Ru33ian organ of Social-Demoorucy. Only such an organ will be
capable of lea-ling the movement onto the high road of the political struggle.
"Push out the framework and broaden the content of our propaganda, agitational
and organisational activity"—thes^ words uttered by P. B. Axelrod must serve
as our slogan defining the activities of Russian Sooial-DemocrEl3 in the im-
mediate future, and we adopt tBds 3logan in the programme of our organ.
Vte appeal not only to Socialists and ola3S conscious workers; we also
call upon all those who are oppressed by the present political system. Me
place the columns of our publication at their disposal in order that they
may expose all the abominations of the Russian autocracy.
Those who regard Social-Democracy as an organisation serving exclusively
the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat may remain satisfied with merely
local agitation and "pure and simple" labour literature. We do not regard
Social-Democracy in this wayj we regard it as a revolutionary party, insep-
arably linked up with the labour movement and directed against absolutism.
Only whan organised in such a party will the proletariat—the most revolution-
ary class in modern Russia be in a position to fulfill the historical task
that confronts it, namely, to unite under its banner all the democratic ele-
ments in the country and to crown the stubborn fight waged by a number of
generations that have perished in the past with the final triumph over the
hated regime.
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The purposes of this thesis were three-fold. First, it was desired to
bring under one eover a factual aooount of the Russian Sooial-Democratie Party
over a very limited, but important period of years. This had not previously
existed in English. From this primary purpose stemmed a secondary purpose;
that of tracing the development of a revolutionary newspaper which was an
integral part of the Soeial-Demoeratio movement itself; and finally, the thesis
was devoted to an exposition of the newspaper's influence on the Russian revo-
lutionary movement.
The chief actor3 in the story were persons known to all socialists and
most informed readers. They were Lenin, Trotsky, I. 0. Martov, and G. V. Plek-
hanov. During 1900, they, with the exception of Trotsky who was still in Rus-
sian exile, conceived of the idea of publishing a conspiratorial newspaper de-
voted to the spreading of their revolutionary Marxian ideas. In December of that
3ame year at Stuttgart, Qermany, the first issue of their newspaper named Iskra
left the presses. During the next two years their enterprise suffered through
internal conflicts and arguments and rejoiced at the increasing number of ad-
herents who flocked to their banner. Two tendencies in Russian Social-Democracy
had exhibited themselves during this period. One, that supported by l3kra . ex-
pressed the need for an immediate socialist revolution and a highly centralized
revolutionary organization. The other, so-called "Economic" tendency, which
found support among more moderate socialists, expressed the desire to bring about
workers benefits (such as shorter hours and better working conditions) first, and
worry about a revolution afterwards. During 1900 to 1903 the Iskra editors
devoted many pages of their publication to a refutation of the "Economic" tend-
ency. Naturally enough this type of activity was harmful to the unity of the
Social-Democratic organization but Lenin and others considered it absolutely
essential.
During 1903, in an attempt to unite the party under Iskra . a congress of
the Russian Social-Democrats was called in Brussels and London. During the first
sessions Lenin as leader of the Iskra group which predominated at the Congress
carried all important issues before Ua. Toward the middle of the Congress;
Martov, an Iskra editor, disagreed with Lenin on some important considerations
and he succeeded in splitting the Congress. Prom this split came the two groups,
Bolsheviks and Monshevlks : the first lod by Lenin and the latter by Hirtov and
Trotsky. After the Congress the Menshevlks gained control of Iskra and that
newspaper as an expression of Lenin's centralist, "immediate revolutionary" views
was finished.
Russian Social-Democracy during the years 1900-1904 was in a formative peri-
od. At first it amounted to little more than a relatively small group of exiled
Russian intellectuals publishing a clandestine revolutionary newspaper which was
hazardously smuggled into Russia. Gradually, however, more and more workers in
Russia joined Iskra 's ranks and at least an embryonic revolutionary force was in
the making. Iskra 's importance lay, first, in the fact that it served as a prov-
ing ground for the future leaders of the Communistic State; secondly, in that it
helped spread the Social-Democratic message in Russia) and, finally, in that it
helped bring about a congress which clearly defined the party issues which later
were to be resolved into a single set of principles.
